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GlocalEAST

Developing a new curriculum in Global Migration, Diaspora and Border
Studies in East-Central Europe

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GlocalEAST EDUCATION AND TRAINING NEEDS ANALYSIS

Comparative report

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About the project

“Developing a new curriculum in Global Migration, Diaspora and Border Studies in East-Central Europe” (GLocalEAsT) is Erasmus+ project carried out by six universities as full partners and ten associated partners from different countries. The duration of the project is three years – from 01.09.2020 until 31.08.2023.

GLocalEAsT strategic partnership in Migration, Diaspora and Border Studies is designed to address the contemporary challenges in East-Central Europe by promoting research, practice and political links in addressing migration issues, following both transnational and trans-sectoral perspectives. The project embodies the simultaneous creation of an innovative curriculum in Migration, Diaspora and Border Studies and a platform of experts from academic, NGOs and local governmental institutions monitoring migration and integration processes in East-Central Europe.

Moving from a national to a transnational perspective, the GLocalEAsT consortium will meet the need for developing new interdisciplinary and innovative courses through the development of a new curriculum that would provide the students with practice-driven skills to be acquired through both classes and internships, facilitating the transition of students to the labour market. Simultaneously, the GLocalEAsT consortium will engage the participating institutions in the development and testing of innovative digital methods and pedagogies, aiming at elaborating attractive teaching methods, strengthening the staff professional profiles, filling gaps in specific teaching areas, and promoting internationalisation and networking.

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Introduction

This report summarises and compares the results of the national reports by partners of the GlocalEAST project – *Developing a new curriculum in Global Migration, Diaspora and Border Studies in East-Central Europe*. In the first phase of the project, every partner country elaborated two reports, which formed the basis for the initial needs assessment for education on migration in the partner countries.

The first report (O1A1) mapped the existing offer of the Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) on the topics of migration, diaspora and border studies and offered a general overview of the number and the basic characteristics of courses / study programmes in respective countries (mainly their thematic focus, geographical scope, language of instruction, and key knowledge / skills covered).

The second report (O1A2) outlined the main trends and dynamics of migration-related issues in each partner country, bringing attention to the national contexts and current challenges of managing migration and integration of migrants. At the same time, in the second report, the partners presented the results of the survey on the readiness of the HEI graduates for work in the field of migration and migrant integration. Using various methods, the partners described the main gaps in the existing educational offer and identified opportunities for developing new curriculum on migration, diaspora and border studies in the framework of the GlocalEAST project.

The ambition of this comparative report is to provide a concise overview of the educational needs in the partner countries, taking into consideration national specificities on the one hand and defining common areas for development on the other. Moreover, to better grasp the present situation in each partner country, this report begins with a short introduction into the national migration contexts from a comparative perspective.

Part I. Comparative outlook on immigration and emigration

There are large differences regarding immigration between Western and CEE countries

When comparing the stocks and shares of immigrants, our six project countries could be divided into two significantly different groups. Germany and Italy have been destination countries of large migration flows for much longer periods, the share of immigrants/foreign born people, people with migration background and refugees is much higher there, especially when considering people from third countries, outside the European Union and Europe.

The share of foreign population was 12.5 percent in Germany in 2019 and 8.4 percent in Italy in 2020, and 72 percent of the latter originated from non-EU countries. In Germany inhabitants with a so-called “migration background” made up 26 percent of the population in 2019 and 35.2 percent of them related to some EU Member State, the rest, roughly three quarters had roots in extra-EU countries.

The situation in the CEE countries has been quite different. The share of foreign citizens on total population varied between 2.8 percent in Lithuania and less than 1 percent in Serbia. With Croatia (2.1 %), and Slovakia (1.4 %) being somewhere in between. Despite low shares there is a considerable growth in the number and share of foreign residents during the last few years. For example, the share of foreigners has almost doubled in Croatia and Lithuania in just a short period between 2017 and 2020, the number of foreigners intensified up to 7 times in Slovakia since 2004 (the year when Slovakia entered the European Union), and the number of foreign workers also increased 4-fold in a decade between 2010 and 2019. (Not surprisingly foreign employment declined in 2020 due to the economic consequences of coronavirus pandemic.) On the other hand, this naturally means that 5 or 10 years ago the share of foreigner citizens in the 4 CEE countries involved in our project was even much lower, around or below 1 percent and thus, marginal.

Regarding foreign-born populations the differences between the two groups are rather smaller, but mostly due to specific historic development in the CEE countries. The share of foreign born has been a little over 13 percent in Croatia and 9 percent in Serbia, around 5 percent in Lithuania and almost 4 percent in Slovakia (but still over 10 percent in Italy and almost 20 in Germany). Thus, the share of foreign-born is much higher in CEE countries compared to the share of foreign citizens. However, to a large degree this is the consequence of the historic fact that all these countries were parts of larger federations (former Yugoslavia, Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia) for decades and as such experienced considerable internal migration flows during and shortly after this period. Not surprisingly, the largest foreign-born groups are originated from other parts (republics) of these former federations. The largest parts of foreign-born population of Croatia and Serbia were born in Bosnia and Hercegovina followed by other ex-Yugoslav republics. The most important country of origin of Lithuania’s migrant stock is the Russian Federation, followed by Belarus and Ukraine. And finally, almost half of Slovakia’s foreign-born population was born in the Czech Republic. Usually these already established migration patterns continued even after the dissolution of larger state entities but mostly at lower intensity.

The structure of Serbia’s and partially Croatia’s foreign-born population is specific even within this group. The vast majority of the foreign-born population in Serbia is made of ethnic Serbs from Bosnia and Hercegovina, Croatia, and Kosovo and Metohija who arrived in hundreds of thousands as refugees due to the armed conflicts in ex-Yugoslav republics, which resulted in waves of forced migration. In

Croatia large part of immigrants came from Bosnia and Herzegovina, most of them are of Croatian ethnicity and many arrived already with Croatian citizenship (often possessing dual citizenship).

Table 1. Population by citizenship and place of birth

		2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Germany	total	81 802 257	80 222 065	80 327 900	80 523 746	80 767 463	81 197 537	82 175 684	82 521 653	82 792 351	83 019 213	83 166 711
	Foreign citizens	7 130 919	6 107 216	6 342 394	6 643 699	7 015 236	7 539 774	8 651 958	9 219 989	9 678 868	10 089 292	10 398 022
	Foreign born	9 812 263	8 935 603	9 117 874	9 456 225	9 807 877	10 220 418	10 908 255	12 105 436	13 745 843	14 879 635	15 040 708
Italy	total	59 190 143	59 364 690	59 394 207	59 685 227	60 782 668	60 795 612	60 665 551	60 589 445	60 483 973	59 816 673	59 641 488
	Foreign citizens	3 648 128	3 879 224	4 052 081	4 387 721	4 922 085	5 014 437	5 026 153	5 047 028	5 144 440	4 996 158	5 039 637
	Foreign born	5 787 893	5 759 022	5 715 065	5 695 883	5 737 213	5 805 328	5 907 452	6 020 614	6 175 337	6 069 000	6 161 391
Croatia	total	:	:	:	4 262 140	4 246 809	4 225 316	4 190 669	4 154 213	4 105 493	4 076 246	4 058 165
	Foreign citizens	:	:	:	27 854	31 704	36 679	40 926	45 951	51 995	66 473	86 765
	Foreign born	:	:	:	574 383	568 678	561 093	547 929	539 588	528 982	527 308	533 769
Lithuania	total	3 141 976	3 052 588	3 003 641	2 971 905	2 943 472	2 921 262	2 888 558	2 847 904	2 808 901	2 794 184	2 794 090
	Foreign citizens	27 318	24 031	22 865	22 224	21 577	22 470	18 682	20 117	27 344	47 186	65 819
	Foreign born	160 772	149 544	143 675	140 221	137 417	136 021	129 706	127 351	130 975	138 171	152 578
Slovakia	total	5 424 925	5 435 273	5 404 322	5 410 836	5 415 949	5 421 349	5 426 252	5 435 343	5 443 120	5 450 421	5 457 873
	Foreign citizens	65 894	69 607	70 727	72 925	59 151	61 766	65 840	69 695	72 883	76 116	78 936
	Foreign born	64 422	68 135	156 883	158 164	174 908	177 624	181 642	186 217	190 308	194 389	198 429

Note: On January the 1st each year, stateless persons included in the “Foreign citizens” category.

Source: Eurostat Database

The countries in our sample have large regional differences considering the geographical disposition of immigrant population. The share of immigrants is traditionally much higher in former West Germany and much lower in the Eastern provinces (former GDR), there is a similar difference between the North and South of Italy. In the CEE countries immigrants are also concentrated in the more developed regions, especially around big cities, most notably in the region of the capital.

To conclude, CEE countries have much lower shares of more recent immigrants, especially those originating from outside Europe (and outside former federal states these countries belonged to) compared to Germany and Italy. Mass migration from the African continent or the wider Middle East is still a non-existing phenomenon unlike in Germany and Italy where migrants from these countries arrived in hundreds of thousands during the last decades. Many of them came as refugees.

In the case of refugees, there is even bigger gap between the two groups

While Germany has been the most important destination country of asylum seekers during the 2015-16 migration crisis with hundreds of thousands of asylum applications, the CEE countries still function as transit countries counting asylum claims in hundreds or maximum thousands and deciding to give some form of international protection usually only for a maximum of few dozen applicants. Large differences prevail even if we count the numbers relative to the size of the population of analysed countries. Even states geographically situated on the “Balkan route” which served as the main transit corridor for asylum seekers during the refugee crisis, like Serbia or Croatia have incredibly low numbers. Italy has been somewhere in between during the last few years, with much higher number of applications and positive decisions compared to the CEE group but still far lower than Germany, being partially a transit, partially a target country.

Data on asylum but also on irregular migration reflect large fluctuations in all observed countries. For example, the wave of asylum seekers culminated between 2014 and 2018 during the refugee crises in most countries but not in Slovakia. Italy experienced large changes in the shares of positive decisions as well, in CEE countries the low rate of positive decisions is rather a long-term phenomenon. There are several possible explanations for this. First, the low recognition rates are usually not combined

with high rejection rates but with large number of suspended or stopped asylum procedures. Especially CEE countries (but partially Italy as well) have been considered as transit countries by the migrants. They leave during the asylum procedure to further Western/Northern countries like Austria, Germany, Scandinavian or Benelux states. The authorities therefore are not able to finish the asylum procedure. Second, many of the asylum seekers arrive from countries that are not considered unsafe by the authorities and many of these applications are rejected. For example, in Italy during the last decade the first nine sending countries of asylum seekers were the following: Nigeria, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Gambia, Mali, Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Guinea – Eritrea and Afghanistan followed only after. German statistics also demonstrate that asylum seekers from countries like Syria or Eritrea had much higher chance to get some form of protection than people from countries like Nigeria or Iran. And finally, the political development in each country might affect the strictness of asylum legislation and applied policies. When politicians and parties that try to extract political capital from problems related to migration enter governments it might lead to tougher policies to control and reduce immigration, especially its irregular form.

All in all, the differences regarding asylum applications are staggering. While Germany in 2019 decided to offer some kind of protection to 70 thousand asylum seekers and the corresponding number in Italy was over 18 thousand, Serbia granted protection to 25, Slovakia to 35 and Croatia and Lithuania to few dozens of refugees (Table 2).

Table 2. Asylum applications and asylums granted

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Germany applications	48 590	53 345	77 650	126 995	202 815	476 620	745 265	222 625	184 235	165 685	122 015
Positive decisions	10 450	9 675	17 140	20 125	40 560	140 915	433 910	261 630	75 940	70 320	62 470
Italy applications	10 050	40 350	17 350	26 620	64 625	83 540	122 960	128 855	59 950	43 775	26 550
Positive decisions	4 310	7 155	22 030	14 390	20 580	29 615	35 405	31 795	30 670	18 375	11 585
Croatia applications	:	:	:	1 080	450	210	2 225	975	800	1 400	1 605
Positive decisions	:	:	20	25	25	40	100	150	135	55	40
Lithuania applications	495	525	645	400	440	315	430	545	405	645	315
Positive decisions	15	25	55	55	70	85	195	285	135	90	80
Slovakia applications	540	490	730	440	330	330	145	165	175	230	280
Positive decisions	90	115	190	70	170	80	210	60	45	35	40

Note: All asylum applications from all foreign countries – aggregated data for the given year. (Total number of positive decisions refers to the sum of decisions granting refugee status, subsidiary protection status, authorisation to stay for humanitarian reasons (for countries where applicable) and temporary protection.

Source: Eurostat Database

CEE countries are still emigration countries contrary to Germany and Italy

While the countries in our sample have many similarities regarding their emigration histories and consequent diaspora communities worldwide, the present is different again: Germany and Italy became countries of immigration decades ago (although not at the same time), CEE countries on the contrary are still emigration societies. To clarify, it means in our understanding that the stock of emigrants from these countries is much bigger than the stock of immigrants and the same applies for labour migration. Still more (usually a lot more) Croat, Lithuanian, Serb or Slovak citizens work abroad than is the number of foreign citizens employed in their countries. This is not to say that in certain periods CEE countries cannot have positive migration balances. For example, most recently Lithuania had a positive migration balance or Slovakia has migration surpluses for a relatively long time. (However, caution is needed when interpreting official data, many CEE countries including Slovakia have problems with counting their emigrants using the opportunity of the free movement of persons within the EU. Often they do so without noticing domestic authorities while keeping not only their

citizenship but their permanent resident status at home as well. Therefore, positive migration balances are often illusory, they do not reflect the reality.)

The common point for all analysed countries is the mass emigration to the “new world” mostly the USA but also to Canada, Australia and large parts of Latin-America in the 19th and early 20th century when large ethnic diaspora communities were born. (Except for Germany, there was a large migration towards Western European countries as well.) Also, mass migration of Germans towards Central and Eastern Europe was a commonplace during the Middle Ages and later, up to the 19th century. Croats, Serbs and Slovaks were also migrating in large numbers mostly within the borders of the former Habsburg (Austrian, later Austro-Hungarian) empire. Later, in the case of the CEE countries the – already mentioned – migration within federal states (Yugoslavia, Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia) followed. As a result, Slovaks are still the largest minority ethnic group in the Czech Republic, for example.

Nowadays the situation is very different, Germany (or at least its former Western part) ceased to be an emigration country (with negative migration balance) after the Second World War. First masses of expelled ethnic Germans from Eastern, Central Eastern and Southern Europe arrived. Very soon, after 1955 large waves of guest workers followed from Southern Europe (most notably Italy), Turkey and former Yugoslavia. Meanwhile Italy has been still a country of emigration but from the 1970s large net outflows stopped and from the 1990s migration balance has been increasingly positive. On the other side, CEE countries have been still countries of emigration during the last decades. After the fall of the iron curtain labour migration dominated to Western-European countries like the UK and Ireland, also Germany and Austria but partially Italy as well. (Italy has far bigger immigrant communities from post-socialist CEE countries, which are not covered in this research like Romania, Albania, Ukraine or Moldova). Although EU accession has intensified labour migration flows from Slovakia and Lithuania, it is not a necessary precondition as the cases of Croatia and Serbia demonstrate. They had long experience with migration to Western Europe dating back to the 1960s and these flows intensified again from the 1990s regardless of the fact that Croatia joined the EU only in 2013 and Serbia is still not a member. (Immigration from Croatia and Serbia especially during the 1990s, during the wars in ex-Yugoslavia was different since among the motivation not only economic but also political reasons played an important role.) Current stocks of emigrants (citizens living abroad) are estimated to far higher numbers than the immigrant population in CEE countries. For example, there are about 300 – 350 thousand citizens of Slovakia living abroad according to some estimates, or the 2002 census found 414 thousand Serbian emigrants living abroad – these are rather conservative estimates, many experts put much higher figures. But even if we use the low end of the estimates, we get much higher figures compared to the number of immigrants (presented above).

The fact, that Germany and later Italy became countries of immigration does not mean that emigration from these countries ceased to exist. Actually, emigration from Italy has been on the rise again during the last decade with around 900.000 people leaving the country between 2010-2019. The reasons behind the increasing emigration trend are to be found in the dysfunctional national job market, which pushes mainly young generations to move to other states. In 2019, the main destination of outgoing migration has been the United Kingdom.

Diaspora ethnic communities born in historic migration waves have been an important source of return-migration in most of analysed countries and represent a large potential of possible future migrants. All countries in our sample have some policies facilitating the return of the diaspora (old and new) to the “mother country”. The German experience is quite unique, as the vast majority of remaining former Eastern-European ethnic Germans and their descendants called “Aussiedler” or “Spätaussiedler” migrated to Germany from the 1950s, but especially after the fall of the Iron Curtain

and the disintegration of the Eastern Block. According to the German Microcensus of 2019, there were 2.6 million people who belonged to this group. Most came from the successor states of the former Soviet Union (2019: 1.6 million) – and here primarily from Kazakhstan (720.000) and Russia (661.000), as well as from Poland (699.000) and Romania (226.000).

In Italy, a large section of the new wave of Italian citizens' immigration comes from those countries where traditionally Italian emigration has been strong throughout the twentieth century (i.e. Brazil, Germany, United Kingdom, and Switzerland). In Slovakia, out of the large emigration wave between 2000 and 2012, on average half of Slovak emigrants returned until 2015 according to one study. In Lithuania, the rising number of re-emigrants helped to turn migration balance to positive area and this resulted in stopping the population decline in 2020. In Croatia the number of re-emigrants is estimated to few tens of thousands, most of them is returning from Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, and other European countries, and are mainly around the age of retirement. Very often they live bi-locally, in their West destinations and in locations in Croatia (or Bosnia and Herzegovina), where they also own real estate. Return migration patterns might be fragile, things can change quite fast. For example, promising political changes in Serbia in 2000 resulted in return migration of many members of Serbian diaspora but their hopes were soon abandoned, so many left again.

Looking at the autochthonous ethnic minorities it is the other way around

Contrary to the numbers and shares of immigrants and refugees, in the case of autochthonous ethnic minorities it is the group of CEE countries which has large communities while the share of traditional ethnic minorities in Germany and Italy is marginal. In the CEE countries the share of autochthonous ethnic communities is around or above 10 percent and there are one or two large groups above 2 percent of the total population. According to the last census (2011) the Hungarian ethnic community in Slovakia makes 8.5 percent of the population, the Roma community another 2 percent (however, subjective estimates put the share of the latter almost as high as the Hungarian one). In 2011 censuses the share of Polish ethnic community in Lithuania was above 6 percent and the Serbian minority in Croatia 4.4 percent and there were considerable Hungarian (3.5 %), Roma and Bosniak (both 2 %) communities in Serbia as well. On the other hand, the share of traditional ethnic minorities in Germany is below 0.5 percent and share of "historical linguistic minorities" in Italy is below 1 percent (if we do not count Sardinian as a separate language and ethnicity – if we do, it will increase the share of minorities almost to 3 percent).

Public perception, political discourse and political consequences


Regarding the public perception of immigrants, refugees and generally the issue of migration the picture is much more diverse, it is impossible to divide our sample to two different groups. However, we still can find some common attitudes in CEE countries. Most importantly, the concerns over the readiness and the ability of CEE countries to accept and integrate immigrants – especially with entirely different cultural backgrounds – and the concerns over the negative demographic development. The latter includes the fears related to the demographic crisis, mostly to falling birth rates, relatively high mortality, high emigration and their combined effects: shrinking and aging populations and depopulation of some regions. These feelings are especially strong in Croatia, Lithuania and Serbia, not as much in Slovakia (with rather stagnating and not falling population) but they are almost non-

existent in this context in Germany or Italy. The other common point is the readiness and ability to welcome and integrate immigrants. The main viewpoint (often echoed by the political elites) here is that CEE countries are still underdeveloped and poor compared to Western Europe, additionally they have very few if any experiences with the integration of immigrants and consequently they are particularly ill-fitted to accept large numbers of immigrants/refugees. In Slovakia, an additional argument is often used in this context: the mostly unsuccessful integration of the (traditional) Roma minority. Here, the argument goes this way: “If we were unable to integrate the Roma for decades how can we integrate the new immigrants from very different cultures?”.

Generally – apart from the two common things mentioned above – the situation regarding public opinion towards migrants is much more diverse than elsewhere. When considering public attitudes like the impact and contribution of migrants on/to host societies, respectively their role on the labour market, Eurobarometer surveys demonstrate that Germany is somewhere in the middle, around EU-averages while most CEE countries – including Croatia and Slovakia – are at the negative end of the interval. However, this does not apply to Lithuania which is much closer to Germany (and the EU average) and Italy is in between Germany and most of CEE in some cases closer to the first one, in some others to the second group. A would-be explanation for the unexpected position of Lithuania might be that it is geographically not situated on the Balkan route, therefore was not directly affected by the migration crisis. However, the same applies for Slovakia, which received only 330 asylum applications and granted 8 asylums in 2015, but still has one of the most negative attitudes against the migrants.

Unfortunately, Serbia, as a non-member state is not included in these EU-wide Eurobarometer opinion polls. Data from national surveys suggest that Serbia would be close to the CEE countries but it might be misleading to generalize since attitudes towards migrants might differ substantially depending on their origin – whether they’re ethnic Serb migrants/refugees and internally displaced persons or foreigners. Regarding social distance (e.g. potentially accepting migrants as friends, family members or neighbours) Germany is again in the middle and close to the EU average, Lithuania maintains its position near to it but this time is joined by Croatia while Italy moves next to Slovakia towards the negative end (non-acceptance) of the interval. Thus, again, the situation is diverse, sometimes even confusing, it is hard to distinguish clear groups and trends here.

Figure 1-2. **Perceptions of the impact of immigrants on EU societies** (European Commission 2018. Special Eurobarometer 469, p. 72, 73)








Figure 3-4. Levels of comfort to interact with immigrants across various social relations (Special Eurobarometer 469, p. 41, 43)



Source for all figures: European Commission 2018. Special Eurobarometer 469. Integration of immigrants in the European Union (Fieldwork October 2017, publication 13 April, 2018), (https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/results-special-eurobarometer-integration-immigrants-european-union_en)

The refugee crisis had widespread influence on political discourses and political development in almost every country and contributed to the securitization of the topic. Attempts to curb irregular migration were present across the board but did not prevent large parts of the electorates to turn for more radical solutions or politicians proposing them. The German experience has been unique as the country initially responded to the challenge with very positive public opinion regarding the admission of refugees and basically opened its borders de facto suspending the Dublin III regulation. This went hand in hand with a “welcome culture” towards arriving refugees, which was brought forward by a large part of the population as well as media, followed by the famous and often repeated expression of Chancellor Angela Merkel “Wir schaffen das” (“we make it”) referring to the ability of the country to cope with the massive problem. The majority remained open to accepting refugees and regards migration as an opportunity, especially for the labour market, however, also sees the challenges of immigration and often regards an increase in cultural and religious pluralism as a threat to the social cohesion. The society also became more polarised and part of the political spectrum more radicalized. Riding the wave, the anti-immigration right-wing AfD (Alternative for Germany) party made it to the Bundestag by tripling its votes in the federal elections of 2017 and became the third largest party.

Paradoxically, the migration crisis had similar effects in Slovakia, the country with almost no refugees at all. The largely securitised anti-migration sentiment has become the leitmotif of the national election campaign in March 2016 and brought success to parties with strong anti-migration rhetoric, including the extreme right-wing party with neo-Nazi roots (LSNS) which gained seats in the Parliament for the first time with 8,04% of votes. But contrary to Germany, in Slovakia most parties, including the mainstream used tough anti-immigrant rhetoric, even the governing party Smer-SD (SD refers to social democracy), which continued as the main force of a governing coalition after 2016. There were only few dissenting voices. Considering the Slovak development, it is not surprising that in Croatia and Serbia – situated in the middle of the Balkan route where hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers passed on their way to Western Europe – the refugee crisis became a hotly debated issue with right-wing and nationalist parties demanding tougher policies and stricter border protection.

In Italy too, immigration has constantly been a central topic in media debates and politics despite gradually decreasing number of refugee arrivals. As reported in the latest research published by ISMU, news on immigration aired by the main tv broadcasts in Italy has reached the highest level in 2019, with over 10.4% of total news focusing on the migration issue. Moreover, according to polls conducted by Demos & PI, in 2017-2018 the share of the population considering migration as the main threat to national stability reached its highest level in recent decade (41%).

The COVID-19 pandemic and especially related containment measures like lockdowns and travel restrictions curbed migration dynamics in every country substantially – in some cases dramatically. Immigration, emigration, asylum applications declined everywhere but as most recent data from first half of 2021 indicate, the declining intensity of migration flows is likely to be a temporary phenomenon. Once restrictions are lifted and life returns to normal – which is mostly dependent on the success of the ongoing vaccination campaigns – migration flows will probably return to pre-pandemic levels.

In the national reports there is only one example which seemingly goes contrary to this development. In Italy instead of decrease of remittances (what we would expect with declining migration) we witnessed an increase of registered money transfer abroad (i.e. 3.3 billion euros in the first six months of 2020; 2.8 billion euros in the first six months of 2019). However, even this is likely to be a consequence of declining migrant mobility: the explanation may be the increased registration of

money transfers, which in pre-COVID times were mainly made informally (i.e., managed in person by travel) but as the mobility of migrants declined, they turned in increasing numbers to formal (official) money transfer possibilities.

Integration policies - the hardest assessment

Considering the wide-ranging strategic documents, plans, policies, institutions and organizations shaping integration policies – described in national reports – it is very difficult to make a meaningful and objective comparison of our project countries regarding this area. Fortunately, the most comprehensive, multi-dimensional global measurement tool mapping integration policies, namely *The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX)*¹ includes all our project countries allowing us to make a comparison based on a large number of indicators (Table 3).² Therefore, we decided to use this most objective measurement tool in our comparative analysis.

MIPEX maps 52 countries which are categorised under 10 different groups that reflect their overall approach to integration and their level of policy development. The groups range from the “Top Ten countries” with most comprehensive policies guaranteeing equal rights, opportunities and security for immigrants to the 10th group called “Immigration without Integration” where these rights are denied. From our project countries Germany and Italy have the highest overall score of 58 (from 100) which puts them to the shared 14-16th place and the 3rd group called “Temporary integration - Halfway favourable”. The countries of this group *“provide immigrants with basic rights and equal opportunities, but not a secure future in the country. Policies in these countries encourage the public to see immigrants as their equals and neighbours, but also as foreigners rather than as potential citizens.”*

The next country is Serbia with 50 points on the shared 24-27th place belonging to the 4th group called “Equality on paper - Halfway favourable”. *“Equality on paper means that immigrants enjoy equal rights and long-term security, but not equal opportunities. Policies generally encourage the public to see immigrants as their equals, as potential citizens, but also as strangers rather than as neighbours.”*

The remaining three countries Croatia, Lithuania and Slovakia belong to group No. 8. and 9. “Equality on paper - Halfway unfavourable” and “Equality on paper - Slightly unfavourable”. Both groups are characterized as following: *“Equality on paper means that immigrants do not enjoy equal opportunities.”* Additionally, group No. 8 – where Slovakia belongs – as: *“This group of countries mainly focus on basic rights for immigrants, and only go halfway towards providing them with long-term security. Policies may encourage the public to see immigrants as equal but also as subordinate and not potential citizens.”*

Situation in the 9th group with Croatia and Lithuania on board is even a bit worse as “This group of countries goes only halfway towards providing immigrants with basic rights and a secure future. Policies may encourage the public to see immigrants as subordinates, not equal and not potential citizens”. As demonstrated in Table 3 only four countries (China, Russia, Indonesia and India) belonging

¹ Migrant Integration Policy Index available at: <https://www.mipex.eu/>

² MIPEX measures eight areas of integration policies within three key dimensions. These are the following: 1. Basic rights: Can immigrants enjoy comparable rights as nationals? e.g., equal rights to work, training, health, and non-discrimination; 2. Equal opportunities: Can immigrants receive support to enjoy comparable opportunities as nationals? E.g. targeted support in education, health, and political participation; 3. Secure future: Can immigrants settle long-term and feel secure about their future in the country? e.g., family reunification, permanent residence and access to nationality.

to the most unfavourable group “Immigration without integration” had lower overall scores in the last MIPEX 2020 evaluation than Slovakia, Croatia and Lithuania. In other words, there is considerable room for improvement regarding integration policies in these three countries.

Table 3: Overall scores in the 2020 MIPEX ranking of 52 countries

Ranking, country name	Overall score 2020	Change since 2014	Approach to integration
1. Sweden	86	- 1	Top 10 (Comprehensive)
2. Finland	85	+ 3	Top 10 (Comprehensive)
3. Portugal	81	+ 3	Top 10 (Comprehensive)
4. Canada	80	+ 2	Top 10 (Comprehensive)
5. New Zealand	77	/ 0	Top 10 (Comprehensive)
...			
14-16. Germany	58	+ 1	Temporary Integration
14-16. Argentina	58	- 4	Equality on paper
14-16. Italy	58	- 1	Temporary Integration
...			
24-27. Serbia	50	+ 5	Equality on paper
...			
45-46. Croatia	39	+ 1	Equality on paper
45-46. Slovakia	39	+ 2	Equality on paper
47-48. Latvia	37	+ 3	Equality on paper
47-48. Lithuania	37	+ 4	Equality on paper
49. China	32	+ 5	Immigration without integration
50. Russia	31	+ 2	Immigration without integration
51. Indonesia	26	+ 1	Immigration without integration
52. India	24	/ 0	Immigration without integration

Source: Migrant Integration Policy Index 2020, pp. 13-14.

(<https://www.mipex.eu/sites/default/files/downloads/pdf/files/a5/mipex-2020-book-a5.pdf>)

As the MIPEX ranking demonstrates Germany still has some reservations regarding the comprehensiveness of its integration policies but among the GlobalEast project countries certainly has the most comprehensive policies and institutional framework for immigrant integration and the most favourable conditions for various groups of (potential) labour migrants. It is a consequence of long development, previously Germany applied strict immigration rules, citizenship and integration efforts were open only for the ethnic German immigrants (*ius sanguis* principle), guest workers were considered as a temporary workforce, and expected to return to their countries of origin and therefore not requiring integration policies. The important turning point came in 1999/2000 when the reform of the law on nationality was adopted, according to which the place of birth (*ius soli*) became decisive in the granting of German citizenship for the first time. Since then, many legislative acts were adopted creating favourable conditions for various groups of (potential) labour migrants (e.g., highly qualified foreign professionals, skilled workers, highly qualified self-employed persons, foreign graduates of German universities, academics from third countries, non-academically trained skilled workers etc.). In the field of persons seeking protection, the situation is rather mixed. On the one hand, after the 2015 refugee crisis Germany introduced a couple of more restrictive measures for immigration; on the other it opened up the labour market for asylum seekers with “good prospects of staying”.

Italy achieved the same scores in the MIPEX ranking as Germany, despite its complex integration framework which lacks a comprehensive integration law at national level, the governance of the policy is split between two ministries, while regions are the key players in planning integration policies, and

municipalities hold the main responsibilities for their implementation. Similarly to Germany the immigration of non-EU foreign citizens is focused on the needs of the labour market, but it is regulated by the principle of annual immigration quotas. Unlike in Germany, the national legislative framework is more unstable, oscillating between more and less restrictive approaches due to the frequently changing political leadership of the country.

CEE countries are a different category well reflected in the MIPEX evaluation. All of them lack a comprehensive and properly implemented integration policy providing non-discriminatory access to employment, housing, healthcare, education, cultural and political participation and various information to immigrants and refugees as well as measurements to ensure their specific needs like the path to citizenship or possibilities for family reunification. Often NGOs or private companies substitute the state in providing important services to migrants. The situation in Serbia is considerable better than in the other three countries, this better environment is largely the consequence of the nature of immigration (large number of Ethnic Serbs arriving from other parts of ex-Yugoslavia).

There are various reasons to explain why the CEE region is lagging behind in the integration of immigrants compared to Western Europe. For example, the lack of sufficient funding, the missing clarity of responsibility among the network of institutions dealing with the issue, and non-existing or weak public policies and institutions on various (especially on regional and municipal) levels. It is also connected to the fact that these countries are still much less attractive in the eyes of potential immigrants and they mostly lack the experience of dealing with large numbers of immigrants (especially with those having different cultural background). Naturally, the much more negative attitudes of the public and consequently the political elites are also reflected in the situation where “equality is only on paper”.

CEE countries during the last few years intensified their efforts to foster return migration of their significant diaspora communities, especially their most recent emigrants. Expatriates and diasporic ethnic communities previously gained significant rights in their countries of origin like citizenship (or a simplified access to it) and in some countries even voting rights in national elections. The success of policies targeting return migration and trying to stop and reverse brain drain so far has been rather limited. Naturally, the quality of return migration and re-integration policies is of less importance here, the economic and political situation in the “mother country” is the more important determinant. Until the considerable gaps in living standards, income levels and employment opportunities between East and West prevail, return migration policies are likely to have moderate outcomes.

Good/best practices (of immigrant integration) and useful examples

National reports identified a few good/best practices, some of them are presented here in order to give some inspiration and useful ideas, which might be considered when constructing higher education programs and courses within our framework of GlocalEast project.

Germany:

The education center (IHK-Projektgesellschaft) of the local Chambers of Commerce in Industry in Frankfurt/Oder manages a project called “Bleibnet Pro Quali für Brandenburg” targeted to asylum seekers and refugees aged between 18 - 65 years, who have at least subordinate access to the labour market and are looking for work or are in precarious employment. The project has been extended several times since 2015. Activities implemented include for example placing participants in language

courses, supporting the recognition of (migrant's education) certificates, assisting with job applications, consulting SMEs on promotion and recruitment issues and implementing competence assessments (see: <https://www.ihk-projekt.de/bleibnet-pro-quali/>). The project might be a good illustration of local program aiming to integrate asylum seekers and refugees to the labour market.

Italy:

Italian municipalities participate in national-sponsored integration programs via the "SAI" (System of Reception and integration) network. One of its specific implementations in the village of Riace has attracted national and international attention for being a successful model of integration and "accoglienza" (hospitality). In 2016, the then Mayor of Riace, Domenico Lucano, was listed by Fortune magazine among the fifty most influential leaders in the world, for his engagement in the field of immigration. In the last two decades, Riace has hosted more than 6000 asylum seekers and refugees, and has been able to revert the depopulation trend. In the early 1990s, there were some 600 inhabitants. The village population incremented instead to 1750 at the end of the 2010s, 400 of whom are refugees from some 20 countries. The main features of the Riace "model" are the use of previously abandoned buildings for migrants accommodation as well as for sustainable tourism; the provision of workshop and training to asylum seekers to revitalize the local craft sector; the creation of new job positions for cultural mediators, workshop implementers and social workers. The example of Riace might be a useful illustration of a successful attempt of addressing two major challenges (depopulation of some microregions and integration of immigrants) at local level.

Croatia:

"Taste of Home" initiative is run by the collective of Taste of Home and the Centre for Peace Studies and was supported over a period of about ten years (2009-2018) by numerous organisations (e.g. the European Commission, the US Embassy in Croatia) which funded the activities of empowering and training refugees in Croatia, so that they can independently start with the process of employment and/or the development of the idea of social entrepreneurship to achieve better integration into society, a media campaign and a documentary film about refugee integration in Croatia and cooperation with organisations of civil society in providing support to refugee integration (<https://www.okus-doma.hr/en>). Studying the "Taste of Home" initiative might be a good illustration of the challenges of integration of refugees in CEE societies as well as the possible solutions to the problems.

Serbia:

"Kanjiža calling" – an example of cross border relations and circular mobility from a municipality in north-eastern Serbia with about 25 thousand residents that encompasses 13 settlements. Coping with challenges well-known across CEE countries like difficult economic situation combined with adverse demographic trends in terms of negative natural change, emigration, depopulation and ageing. Situated near the Hungarian border, with 80% of citizens possessing a passport of the EU (Hungary, due to their Hungarian ethnicity) and consequently having high border mobility, emigration and circular mobility. Circular mobility and rare returns are enabled to those who are financially independent (worked abroad for some period in Hungary, Germany, etc.), who possess high human capital (tertiary education gained abroad in addition to work experience, foreign languages, etc.) as well as social capital, and/or possess material resources to start their own business (land ownership, finances, etc.). These are mostly free professions, artists (costume designer, graphic designer, choreographer, creative entrepreneur, etc.), IT experts, technologists, entrepreneurs. (A video presentation: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bP0ry882eaw>) "Kanjiža calling" project might be a

good illustration of a CEE border regions trying to turn disadvantages to advantages using the potential of circular mobility.

Lithuania:

The "Global Lithuania" program under the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 2012 implemented by 21 state institutions and bodies is connected to the main idea: we are one Lithuanian nation and every motivated Lithuanian or person connecting himself with Lithuania is important and necessary for Lithuania, no matter where he works and lives, everyone can contribute to the progress of the state and society with their knowledge, ideas and experience. The program tries to mobilize state institutions to include projects related to the Lithuanian diaspora in their specialized sphere of activity and at the same time, mobilize the Lithuanian diaspora to strengthen the state and advertise it all over the world. For example, one tool is to strengthen relations with professionals - specific persons who have achievements in the professional field, recognized in their country of residence and who can contribute to the creation of Lithuanian prosperity through specific projects. The "Global Lithuania" program might be a good example for better understanding the potential role that foreign diaspora communities can have representing and advertising their country of origin or contributing to its development.

Slovakia:

In 2018, the Slovak Government has adopted the (historically first) Strategy on Labour Mobility of Foreigners in Slovakia, which represents a key change in legal migration. The Strategy reacts to labour market shortages and negative demographic trends with measures that make the system of employment of migrants from third countries faster, more effective, and flexible, mainly in professions with labour shortage (mostly high-skilled and low-skilled). Besides the easing of several administrative procedures, a list of sectors with labour shortages is being published quarterly in districts with unemployment under 5%. Several other strategic documents highlight that the inflow of qualified labour force is crucial for upholding Slovakia's competitiveness and to prevent barriers for its economic growth (e.g., Strategy of Economic Policy of Slovak Republic until 2030). The Slovak labour migration strategy might be a good illustration of the gradual change of a country of emigration to country of immigration in the CEE region and the possibilities for governments to foster labour migration according to the needs of the labour market.

Part II. Comparative outlook on the existing educational offer

The tradition of teaching migration-related topics in the partner countries varies, and to a certain extent reflects countries' experience with migration as such. Due to the rather minor migration flows and prevalence of emigration in the Central-European countries such as Croatia, Lithuania, Serbia or Slovakia, the issue of international migration has not been politically and societally significant for a longer time. Only with the so-called 'migration crisis' of 2015-2016, the national debates have started to reflect wider migration trends, their European and global dimension and implications for the national context.

Quite contrarily, Germany and Italy have experienced substantial immigration due to their economic level of development. Active policies supporting labour migration in case of Germany, and a natural buffer position of Italy have attracted migrants from less developed European countries and from Africa and Asia (mainly Turkey). As a result, these countries had to deal with challenges of managing migration and integration much earlier, what naturally required training for professionals working in this specific area. In case of the Central European countries, they only gradually realise the complexity of migration issues and their relevance for the national policies, politics, economy and social well-being.

However, in every project country, the HEIs give attention to the migration issues to some extent – either in the form of individual university courses or in study programmes, which offer a complex and tailor-made preparation for certain professions. The general comparative overview is presented in Table 1.

Table 1

	courses	programmes	level	language	obligatory/ elective	disciplinary focus	geographical focus	skills covered / employment opportunities
Croatia	15		mostly undergraduate 1 (9)	mostly Croatian (13)	mostly elective (14)	social science and humanities (sociology, law, history)	national and regional (West-Balkan, Central and South-East European)	migration management, public administration, media, education, research
Lithuania	27		mostly graduate (16)	mostly Lithuanian (21)	elective (15) and obligatory (12)	Political science, sociology, anthropology, history, demography, culture studies	national & international; regional (South East Europe, Baltic sea region)	governmental institutions, EU political institutions; management of migration and ethnic relations
Serbia	43		mostly undergraduate 1 (32)	Serbian only	mostly obligatory (28)	social science and humanities (demography, sociology, geography, law, political sciences, economy and security studies)	national and global	research and data analysis; policy evaluation; work with migrants
Slovakia	19		mostly graduate 1 (12)	mostly Slovak (12) & English	mostly elective	law, social work, political science, ethnic studies	national, EU and regional (V4)	legal counselling and advocacy, social work public institutions, dipolomacy, NGOs, international organisations; research; migration and integration management; work with migrants (psychological and social work, legal counselling)
Italy	-		mostly graduate: 8 MA, 14 Master 25 Degrees	mostly Italian & English		law; sociology, psychology	national, international & regional (Mediterranean)	and integration management; work with migrants (psychological and social work, legal counselling)
Germany	-		mostly graduate 17 (10)	German & English, French		sociology, history, political science, social work, anthropology, psychology, education	national & international; sending countries	social work, education, migration management on national and international level, research, public policy

When looking at the number and scope of the existing educational offer in the project countries, we can identify **two groups of countries. The first group consists of Croatia, Lithuania, Serbia and Slovakia, in which migration issues are covered largely through university courses** of different disciplines of social science and humanities, mostly law, political science, social work, sociology, social anthropology, and ethnic studies. The content of these courses is devoted mostly to character and trends of migration from a certain perspective – historical, geopolitical, sociological or anthropological. They include overview of the national migration policies, global, and transnational migration processes, asylum policies, ethnic relations and minority issues. Given the specific focus of the individual courses, their goal is mainly to provide students with the basic understanding, and orientation in the topic. Only exceptionally, the courses define concrete skills (such as mastering statistical/research methods) or employment prospects of the graduates.

The courses cover mostly the national and the European (EU) context, including the key policies and the legal background, and the links between national and EU dimension. The regional focus varies from country to country and allows understanding the local specificities (Baltic region in case of Lithuania, V4 – Visegrad Four in Slovakia, South-Eastern Europe and Western Balkans in case of Croatia and Serbia).

In a comparative perspective, certain specificities can be observed in every country, often underlining some of the significant aspects from national migration contexts. Starting with Lithuania, several courses focus on migration from the perspective of ethnic relations between migrant populations in the Baltic region, while several courses are devoted specifically to Lithuanian diaspora. A significant part of educational offer on migration in Serbia is embedded in studies of demography, including topics such as migration and development, economy of labour, statistics, and social conflicts in relation with the population movements. In Croatia, the courses are designed largely from a sociological perspective, including aspects of law, history and demography. In Slovakia, law courses prevail, yet these are mostly practically-oriented courses of asylum clinics, preparing students for real-life cases of legal counselling and advocacy in asylum law.

There are several courses devoted to studies of national diaspora (three in Lithuania, one in Slovakia and in Croatia, where four others include diaspora as part of courses on sociology of migration), while Croatia also offers a five-years study programme ‘Demography and Croatian diaspora’ (see below). Courses related to existing migrant population are rather scarce. Very rarely, the perspective of border studies is applied: two courses in Lithuania (in relation to the Baltic sea region and ethnic studies) and one in Croatia (in relation to security studies).

While migration is the central topic of some courses, others integrate migration only in a specific lecture(s) of the overall subject (e.g. in demography, geopolitics, public / international law, nationalism studies, etc.). As a result, even though some courses aspire to offer broader interdisciplinary view on migration, most of them offer a rather narrow single-disciplinary perspective on migration or specific migration-related issues. Moreover, these courses offer mostly academic knowledge and only rarely include practical preparation.

Since most of these courses are optional, their reach is rather limited; the more because they are centralised in the capital and few other universities across the country. Most of the courses are offered in the respective national language, what further limits the access to foreign/ exchange students.

In these countries, the complex approach to studying migration in a specific study *programme* is largely missing. The HEIs in Croatia, Serbia and Slovakia offer only one migration-related study programme – and even though these new programmes are rather ambitious and interdisciplinary,

their reach so far is quite low.³ As a result, students of social sciences and humanities have a very limited opportunity to study migration in its complexity, either from a certain disciplinary or interdisciplinary perspective.

Quite contrarily, Germany and Italy have a longer tradition of teaching migration in a more holistic approach, as a subject of study programmes.⁴ Moreover, as a result of the growing salience of migration in these countries and in Europe, both countries have experienced increase of the number of related study programmes in recent years, meeting the high interests of university students in these topics. The complexity of the study programmes allows defining prospects of future employment more accurately and contributes to a closer interconnection with the specific labour market needs.

Italy currently offers 25 study programmes, focused mainly on law and social work, reflecting the rationale behind these study programmes – to train professionals working in the field of migration management, reception and inclusion. These programmes include both theoretical knowledge and preparation for provision of specific services in the national migration and integration management. The Master degree programmes (first and second level) are in particular skills-oriented, relying on the cooperation with external institutions from the field (governmental institutions, NGOs, research and cultural institutions) and thus providing students with specialised, tailor-made training (e.g. on planning, coordination and evaluation of interventions; accompanying migrants in the reception and integration phase; etc.). Some of the programmes include area specialisation and linguistic preparation, while the focus is largely on the Mediterranean and the Adriatic region. There are no programmes devoted specifically to diaspora and border studies.

In Germany, there are 17 universities, which offer altogether 17 study programs on BA and MA-level in the thematic scope of migration, diaspora and border studies. Based on the recognition that the management of migration and integration requires interdisciplinary and critical perspective, the HEI programs increasingly integrate various fields: the social (and cultural) sciences, law and economics. Moreover, the focus on migrant communities and their home countries is apparent: several study programmes offer specialisation in area and language studies (e.g. Islamic Studies, Slavic Studies, Eastern European Studies), reflecting the origin of the most numerous migrant population (Turkish, Arabic, Eastern European). There are two study programmes devoted to cross-border studies of German-French border regions. The study programmes are designed to provide students with the practical experience already during their studies: at the undergraduate level, some programmes offer dual education (working along with studies), some graduate programmes require one year stay abroad, or obligatory internships. The professional fields that offer jobs for HEI graduates trained in the field of migration and migrant integration are mainly social work, local administrations, international organisations, firms and chamber of commerce, politics, universities, and foundations.

The comparison of the educational offer in the partner countries allows to drive several **conclusions for the development of the next steps** of the project.

³ In Croatia, it is the novel integrated 5-year programme *Demography and Croatian Diaspora* at the University of Zagreb. Since 2017, Serbia launched an interdisciplinary MA programme *Studies of Migration*, which includes the practical preparation. However, is attended only by 10 students yearly. The Department of Social Work of Comenius University in Bratislava offers a Master studies specialisation in International Migration and Development. However, this specialisation is not open every year. In Lithuania's Vytautas Magnus University, the study programme on *Migration policy and history of diasporas* was created in 2017, yet it has not started due to structural reasons.

⁴ Due to a large number of single university courses in Italy and Germany, the partners mapped the study programmes in these countries.

Firstly, currently there is no course or study programme integrating migration, border studies and diaspora in a comprehensive way. The topic of migration is covered from various disciplinary perspectives as well as from multidisciplinary approach typical for study programmes. Yet, issues of borders and diaspora still receive little attention, despite their topicality (e.g. importance of emigration in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, but also of tailored policies towards various migrant communities in host countries).

Secondly, the integration of area studies into courses/study programmes is still minor. Even though some study programmes in Germany and Italy pay attention specifically to migrant-sending countries and to migrant communities in host countries, this is a rather emerging approach. The existing courses in Croatia, Lithuania, Serbia and Slovakia explain the migration phenomenon mainly through the national or EU lens, while they integrate the regional focus on the Central and Eastern Europe exceptionally. In general, the specific focus on the migratory context in the Central and Eastern Europe is rather missing.

Thirdly, in all partner countries, the educational offer regarding migration is still very much limited to the national audience, mainly university students. Despite the fact that some study programmes in Germany and Italy aim at international (English-speaking) audience, most of the programmes target still mostly the domestic students and are run in national languages. In case of Croatia, Lithuania, Serbia and Slovakia, courses on migration are run by few universities only, and are often centralised in the capital. This suggests there is considerable space to expand the migration curricula to broader audience, both geographically and in relation to the target group, which could include the state/local government officials, or practitioners working with migrants in various fields (education, health, labour integration).

The reviews of the respective national HEI educational offer allowed us to identify some of the key skills and competences the students can develop by attending selected courses or study programmes. Yet in order to recognise the actual needs of the labour market and practical application of the university education, we surveyed the practitioners and experts from the field, who shared their views on the readiness of the HEI graduates and competences they need to have in order to work in the field of migration. Therefore, in the next section, we break down the concrete knowledge, skills and attitudes that are necessary to increase the readiness of the HEI graduates for their employment in the professions related to migration. Equally, we summarise expert feedback on perceived gaps, needs and opportunities in the current educational offer.

Theoretical preparation

The evaluation of the expert survey in the partner countries revealed that in every country, there is a necessity to improve existing curricula by including a more complex approach to studies of migration, which would better reflect the needs of the labour market in each country and contribute to better implementation of the migration and integration policies. Overall, all partners underlined the need for an **interdisciplinary approach** that entails social and cultural as well as legal and economic sciences. Given the complexity of the migration phenomenon, the professionals working in this field need to understand both global trends and national specificities, and have a basic understanding of various perspectives on migration (economic, legal, anthropological, etc.). Such a multidisciplinary approach is necessary also due to variety of the professions described in the study programmes – from public administration, research, to direct work with migrants.

Despite the fact that several countries (Croatia, Lithuania, Serbia and Slovakia) do not have a significant number of foreigners, the interviews with local experts revealed the pertaining need for a complex preparation of the HEI graduates so that they are able to grasp the complexity of migration issues and make use of their theoretical knowledge in practice. The often insufficient institutional background of migration and integration policies calls for well-prepared experts who could take positions in state administration and be ready for cross-sectional tasks such as work with clients (applicants or recipients of international protection, labour migrants), cooperating and networking with other state institutions and participating in meetings at the EU level. Moreover, as the case of Lithuania demonstrates, the solutions to domestic problems such as the large-scale emigration rarely involve professionals working in the field. The issue of migration is often hijacked by politicians and seemingly, there is no need for professionals in the field of migration. This is despite the fact that the outcomes of the return programmes in countries facing significant emigration (Croatia, Lithuania, Serbia and Slovakia) are so far very limited and the aging of the population creates shortages in the labour market. Moreover, the dynamic geopolitical development in this region (Ukraine, Belarus) suggests that the incoming migrations flows will also require a professional approach.

In Germany, there is room for development of an **interdisciplinary border study perspective**, which could improve an understanding for the social boundaries migrants meet as well mechanisms of categorization and mobility control. At the same time, there is a lack of an entangled understanding of migration-based factors in sending and transit countries, the historical legacies, as well as the training of language competences. In Italy, further development of **area studies** would allow to connect general understanding of migration with specific knowledge of migrants' countries of origin and specificities of the regional migration flows. Such an approach would largely benefit from the basic knowledge of at least one language spoken in the region as well as from basic legal education provided through case studies. Equally, there is space for a more practical approach through internships and trans-sectoral cooperation, which would allow developing skills in networking, project drafting and planning of EU-funded projects and basic legal and administrative issues.

The *ideal* theoretical preparation should therefore include basic knowledge from the following disciplines of social sciences and humanities.

1) Political science & Law

- a. Actors/organizations in migration (international, EU & national)

- b. Legal basis for migration management (international, EU and national)
 - c. Human rights protection
 - d. Integration mechanisms (theoretical but also practical case studies)
 - e. Geopolitics from migrant perspective (understanding of forced migration)
- 2) Sociology & Economy**
- a. Sociology of migration
 - b. History of migration and current migration trends in the global context
 - c. Social research methodology – how to find the data, process them & create tool for public opinion or qualitative research
 - d. Economic aspects of migration (labour migration, impact and forecasts)
- 3) Anthropology & Cultural Studies**
- a. Cultural background and specificities of migrant communities (understanding political, cultural, social and religious background of migrants’ home countries)
 - b. Models and challenges of integration in host societies
 - c. Migrants’ perspectives and experiences
- 4) Psychology & Social work**
- a. Specific needs of migrants, including vulnerable groups
 - b. Psychological coaching (cultural shock, dealing with trauma, etc.)
 - c. Advisory work and providing social services (migrants’ rights and obligations)

Moreover, most countries highlighted the need to include the **language preparation**. Yet, while in the Central-European countries, the graduates are expected to master at least English in order to be able to work with foreign sources, cooperate with international partners and apply for funds, in Germany and Italy, the rationale reflects rather the need to communicate with migrants in their own language (Turkish, Arabic, Slavic languages).

Practical preparation

Most partners voiced the necessity to include the **practical aspects** of managing migration and integration in university education. While such an approach is better established in Italy and Germany, where study programmes include obligatory internships or work experience, cooperation with external institutions, or HEIs from countries of migrants’ origin, it is still mostly lacking in Croatia, Lithuania, Serbia and Slovakia. Experts in these countries called for better connection of the theoretical knowledge with practical skills, gained through direct experience, e.g. through internships, volunteering, excursions, fieldwork, or mediated through contact with guest lecturers working in the field. Such activities could contribute to a more realistic and holistic perspective on implementation of migration and integration policies, migrant integration in local communities, the migrants’ experiences and challenges, etc.

As a result, in order to better reflect the needs of the labour market and prepare experts able to respond to the actual migration challenges in every country, the university courses/programmes on migration could include trainings and internships focused on the following aspects:

- 1) Practical trainings**
- a. Communication skills: argumentation, negotiation and advocacy, active listening skills
 - b. Cultural mediation (familiarizing migrants with cultural norms of the receiving society and vice-versa; conflict management; de-escalation training)

- c. Diversity training: Critical reflection on personal motivation and attitudes
- d. Analytical skills: research & policy recommendations
- e. Team work (with focus on interdisciplinary teams)
- f. Project writing and management (European & national grant schemes)
- g. Marketing & PR: competent handling of social media tools and platforms


2) Internships

- a. Direct contact with migrants and/or practitioners
- b. Direct implementation of obtained knowledge & skills
- c. Connection between academic and practical expertise

Moreover, the experts in several countries highlighted the need for the HEI graduates to have the **right attitudes** for the work in the field of migration. Above all, they called for an open-minded and respectful attitude, which would include a humane and empathetic approach towards migrants and foreigners as such. Cultural sensitivity and self-reflectivity were noted as crucial for working with the clients, but also in research and policy professions. The need for a self-reflexive and critical approach was voiced specifically in Germany, in order to allow creating of a “postmigrant” society, which situates migration and integration into the centre of society, and which involves all parts of society – a rather new concept for the CEE countries.

The attitudinal aspect in university education could be implemented through integrating diversity training or several other methods, such as direct/mediated contact with migrants and their personal stories, experience from the fieldwork, using case studies from the national context. The good practices from national policies/ NGOs, or migrant communities from other partner countries could serve as a useful lessons to overcome the limits of the national context.

The overall approach to developing a new curriculum in the field of Global migration, diaspora and border studies, should therefore be based on these pillars:



Conclusion

The national reports allowed us to recognise the current educational offer in the project partner countries and to identify potential niche for developing a new curricula, which would respond to both the need of the theoretical and practical preparation of the HEI graduates.

While there are many existing courses and study programmes devoted to various aspects of migration, the benefit of the project curricula could be based on **several novel attributes**:

Firstly, the **interdisciplinary approach** of the new curriculum, which would allow getting out of a single disciplinary focus characteristic for CEE countries and draw inspiration from the complex educational programmes in Germany and Italy. Combination of different disciplines of social sciences and humanities contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of the migration phenomenon and encourages a more holistic and sensitive approach.

Secondly, in order to provide a more specific focus, the new curriculum could be anchored in the **area studies**, and include specific regional focus on the Central and Eastern Europe as well as language preparation. To fill this niche, it could benefit from the unique insights into the regional context by the Croat, Lithuanian, Serbian and Slovak experts, while integrating the interdisciplinary perspective developed at universities in Germany and Italy.

Thirdly, the new curricula should integrate the **practical aspects** in order to support development of students' skills and prepare them for their professional path. Involvement of practitioners as lecturers, internships and closer cooperation with project's associated partners could provide the often-missing practical element in teaching migration.

Fourthly, the **online platforms** could expand the target group for the new curriculum beyond students of several universities, and offer further education to practitioners and professionals working with migrants regardless of their location.

Fifthly, the **international dimension** of the project consortium. The new curriculum could definitely make use of the diverse expertise of the team members and their teaching methods, as well as of the different national migration contexts, in which specific aspects and challenges of migration are relevant. Every partner country can offer a unique perspective on migration and provide case studies to complement the theoretical education. Equally, given the prevalent focus on the national context in the existing educational offer, strong anchoring of the new curricula in the transnational and the global dimension of migration could bring a fresh perspective.