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# GlocalEAST National Report on Migration Policies and Dynamics - Germany

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## OVERVIEW OF KEY DATA IN NATIONAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT

In Germany, the percentage of the foreign population was 8.8 percent (altogether 7.198.946 of 81.751.602 inhabitants) in 2010, of whom 49 percent were female<sup>1</sup>. From 1993 on until 2010, the percentage of foreign population remained relatively stable. In 2019, this percentage raised to 12.5 percent (BAMF 2019: 308/9), while the percentage of women declined a bit to 47.1 percent<sup>2</sup>. The share of the foreign population however varies among the federal states, and here especially among former Western and former Eastern federal states. Berlin has with 19.2 percent the highest percentage of foreigners, followed by Bremen with 18.2 percent. Among the federal states, Hesse leads with 16.5 percent. The lowest percentage of foreigners in federal states which belonged to Western Germany before reunification is the northern federal state Schleswig-Holstein with 8.4 percent. The federal states which belonged to the former GDR have considerably lower numbers of foreigners, the lowest one is Mecklenburg-Vorpommern with 4.7 percent and the highest one is Thuringia with 5.2 percent in 2019 (BAMF 2019: 311).

The number of inhabitants with a so-called “migration background” is considerably higher and includes 26 percent of all inhabitants in 2019. With migration background, all inhabitants are counted who either himself or herself or whose father or mother did not have German citizenship at the time of birth. This means that not all of these persons have migrated themselves. Many of them are born in Germany, but at least one of their predecessors has a migration experience.<sup>3</sup>

In relation to the number of inhabitants with a so-called “migration background”, the East-West and the urban-rural binary is even more pronounced: In 2019, 95.2 per cent of persons with a migration background lived in West Germany and Berlin. In eastern Germany, the share of persons with a migration background in the total population was only 8.2 per cent (western Germany with Berlin: 29.1 per cent, Germany: 26.0 per cent).

This underlines the fact that most migrants in the former Eastern parts of Germany arrived rather recently. In Western Germany, various migration communities date back to labour migration treaties with Italy, Turkey and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia inaugurated in the 1950s and

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<sup>1</sup> Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit – Destatis: 1 Bevölkerung insgesamt und ausländische Bevölkerung 1971 bis 2019, p. 18

<sup>2</sup> See previous footnote.

<sup>3</sup> See for all facts about the share of migration background: <https://www.bpb.de/nachschlagen/zahlen-und-fakten/soziale-situation-in-deutschland/61646/migrationshintergrund-i>

1960s. In the former GDR, labour migration from other socialist countries, especially from Vietnam and Mozambique, and further also from Angola, Cuba, Algeria, Hungary and Poland, also took place, however to a later point in time and the relative numbers were lower compared to the overall population. Similar to the policies related to the so-called “Gastarbeiter”, their stay was regarded as temporal and integration measures remained minimal. Next to contract workers, members of Soviet occupation forces, students from other socialist countries as well as political migrants came to the GDR.<sup>4</sup>

With the fall of the Iron Curtain and the reunification of the GDR and with the FRG, Eastern Germany became a region that was strongly marked by emigration. As the majority of migrants, including contract workers, left, the percentage of foreigners in Eastern Germany fell to under 2 percent of the population.<sup>5</sup> Among them, Vietnamese former contract workers remained the biggest group. Based on high unemployment numbers, many Eastern Germans moved into the western parts of Germany. From the 1990s on, immigration to the East German federal states was based on state-regulated allocation of Third Country migrants. These were first of all the so-called “(Spät-)Aussiedler”, i.e. persons belonging to the German national minority whose families had been living in Eastern and South-eastern Europe and partly also in Asia for generations and who received a privileged access to migration and citizenship in Germany. Secondly, these were Jewish contingent refugees from the successor states of the Soviet Union, and thirdly, asylum seekers and refugees, and here especially from former Yugoslavia. The allocation of migrants depending on state assistance was and is based on the so-called Königstein Key, which measures the population numbers and the tax revenue of the federal states. In general, these immigrants have to remain in their assigned places of accommodation unless they do not depend on public assistance for their livelihood any more or received an asylum status.<sup>6</sup>

When it comes to migration background, Europe, and especially the European Union with its 27 member states is the most significant reference frame: In 2019, 35.2 percent of the persons with a migration background relate to one of the other member states of the European Union, and a further 29.7 percent relate their migration background to another European state. The country

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<sup>4</sup> Patrice G. Putrous 24.08.2020: [Ausländer in Ostdeutschland | bpb](#)

<sup>5</sup> See previous footnote.

<sup>6</sup> See previous footnote.

which was leading here is Turkey, of which 13.3 per cent of persons with migration background related to, followed by Poland (10.5 percent), Russia (6.5 percent), Romania and Italy (4.8 and 4.1 percent respectively). Kazakhstan and Syria are the most important non-European countries persons with a migration background related to, with shares of 5.9 and 4.0 per cent respectively.<sup>7</sup> Until 2015, the number of refugees accepted in Germany were about the European average (with the exception of the early 1990s, when Germany hosted a large number of refugees from former Yugoslavia). This number raised considerably in 2015, when about 800.000 first arrivals were registered in Germany, of whom the largest share were war refugees from Syria. In 2016, this number dropped to 280.000 first arrivals.

Reasons for migrants to leave their homes are manifold and include war, political conflicts, often based on militant autocratic political systems and military regimes, as well as economic reasons, which are in many cases based on the global system of capitalist and neoliberal exploitation and postcolonial power-relations.

Reasons for migrants to choose Germany as destination countries are also manifold. They mostly relate to the hope to build up a livelihood based on the consolidated democracy, the strong economy and the political and religious freedom. Established migrant communities and family networks played another important reason, as this was the case for Syrian migrants.<sup>8</sup> Before the outbreak of the war, there were more than 30,000 Syrians and Germans of Syrian origin living in Germany.<sup>9</sup>

According to the Microcensus of 2019, among persons with migration background are around 2.6 million people who had come to Germany as “Aussiedler” or “Spätaussiedler”. Most came from the successor states of the former Soviet Union (2019: 1.6 million) – and here primarily from Kazakhstan (720.000) and Russia (661.000), as well as from Poland (699.000) and Romania (226.000).<sup>10</sup> While so-called “Aussiedler” came to Western Germany between 1950 and especially after the fall of the Iron Curtain and the disintegration of the Eastern Block in 1989/90, from 1993

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<sup>7</sup> See footnote 1. Statistisches Bundesamt: Mikrozensus – Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund

<sup>8</sup> Förderverein PRO ASYL e.V. (2017): Pro Menschenrechte. Contra Vorurteile. FAKTEN UND ARGUMENTE ZUR DEBATTE ÜBER FLÜCHTLINGE IN DEUTSCHLAND UND EUROPA. 3. Auflage. [https://www.proasyl.de/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Pro\\_Menschenrechte\\_Contra\\_Vorurteile\\_2017\\_Webversion.pdf](https://www.proasyl.de/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Pro_Menschenrechte_Contra_Vorurteile_2017_Webversion.pdf).

<sup>9</sup> Förderverein PRO ASYL e.V. (2017): Pro Menschenrechte. Contra Vorurteile. FAKTEN UND ARGUMENTE ZUR DEBATTE ÜBER FLÜCHTLINGE IN DEUTSCHLAND UND EUROPA. 3. Auflage. [https://www.proasyl.de/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Pro\\_Menschenrechte\\_Contra\\_Vorurteile\\_2017\\_Webversion.pdf](https://www.proasyl.de/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Pro_Menschenrechte_Contra_Vorurteile_2017_Webversion.pdf).

<sup>10</sup> See footnote 1.

on, they were called “Spätaussiedler”, and procedures to receive access to German citizenship became more complex.

Germans who were expelled during and at the end of WWII and their offspring are not counted within the statistics of persons with migration background – even if expellees who came to Germany at the end of WWII made up to 14 Mio. persons and although their experience of forced migration and often also discrimination within the German society was formative for them.<sup>11</sup>

Germany recognises four national/ethnic minorities: the Danish, the Sorbs, the Frisians and the group of Sinti and Roma.

The Danish national minority group is located in the north of Germany, close to the Danish border, and has a size of about 50.000 people (0.1 percent of the overall population in Germany) and its members are mainly bilingual.

The Sorbs are an ethnic minority group with about 60.000 members, who have been settling in today’s Eastern Germany since 600 AD. They regard their Slavic language as the main marker of ethnicity, although the number of active speakers is reducing. They traditionally enjoy partial autonomy.

The Frisians are an ethnic minority group who have settled for centuries along the North Sea coast between the Netherlands and the Danish border. Most Frisians regard themselves at the same time as Germans, despite claiming Frisian as an independent language split into several dialects.

The German Sinti and Roma have been recognised as a national minority in Germany only in 1995 and include about 70.000 people who live all over the country. Many of them speak a not formalised Romani language and their settlement in German territories dates back to the 15th century. They have been ever since exposed to discrimination and exclusion. This was especially the case in WWII, in which over 500,000 of them fell victim to genocide of the National Socialists.<sup>12</sup>

Except of cross-border migration in the case of the Danish minority, these national and ethnic groups hardly affect migration dynamics. In the case of Roma and Sinti, there are also Roma who immigrated with their families to Germany from South-eastern Europe as a result of the wars in the former Yugoslavia or in the years following the EU's eastward expansion. However, they do

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<sup>11</sup> Andreas Kossert, 30.11.2016: Wann ist man angekommen? Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene im Nachkriegsdeutschland | bpb

<sup>12</sup> All information of this section taken from Sonja Wolf (10.03.2017): Zur sozialen und politischen Lage der anerkannten nationalen Minderheiten in Deutschland | APuZ (bpb.de)

not belong to the group recognised as a minority in Germany and it is questionable in which way their migration is affected by the existence of the “native” Roma group in Germany.

Generally, Germans are quite mobile. There were 212.669 Germans who immigrated in 2019 of an overall number of 1.558.612 persons (in 2010 the number was considerably lower: 114.752 persons out of 798.282 persons in total) (BAMF 2019: 236) There are however no distinct return migration movements which should be noted here.

Germany has a positive migration balance. This was however not always the case: In 2008 and 2009, Germany even had a negative migration balance, with minus 55.743 persons in 2008. The positive migration balance reached a peak in 2015, when Germany gained altogether a migration surplus of +1.139.402 persons (those leaving Germany already included). In 2019, Germany reached a migration surplus of 327.060 persons.

For Germany’s migration balance, EU countries are the most important sending and receiving countries. Between 2010 and 2019, inner EU migration nearly doubled (from 398.451 in 2010 to 748.994 in 2019). Next to mobile Germans, who take up the second place in the citizenship statistics listing immigration and emigration balance in 2019, the number of migrants with Romanian, Polish and Bulgarian citizenship is the highest coming to or leaving Germany, followed by migrants with Italian and Croatian citizenship. Migrants with Syrian citizenship ranged only at place seven in 2019.<sup>13</sup>

Cross-border migration dynamics over the last years are well marked with the example of the German-Polish border. Until 2004 Germany had traditionally been the main labour migration destination for Poles (Berlin and western provinces), this changed in together with the UK and Ireland opening their labour markets. Germany allowed access only in 2011 but the situation changed - in its depopulating border areas it was “the job looking for employees” than the opposite. This resulted in two interesting tendencies: First the Polish settlers filling half empty towns on the German side of the border (especially in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern – over ten thousand people are reported to moved there) tanking advantage of higher income and lower living costs<sup>14</sup>. Second,

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<sup>13</sup> BAMF-Bericht (2019): Tabelle 1-2: Wanderungen zwischen Deutschland1 und dem Ausland von 1950 bis 2019. S. 231-232

<sup>14</sup> Jarosław Jańczak, 2017, Cross-Border urbanism on the German-Polish border – Between spatial de-Boundarization and social (re-)frontierization, [in:] European Borderlands. Living with Barriers and Bridges, Elisabeth Boesen, Gregor Schnuer (eds.), London and New York: Routledge, pp. 47-63. ISBN 978-1-4724-7721-1

the cross-border commuters – about 122 thousand Poles crossing the border for employment purposes in the border area every day but living on the Polish side (the highest number on the EU borders)<sup>15</sup>.

Even in 2015, at the heights of the so-called refugee crisis, EU- internal migration ranged on place one in Germany, followed by the number of asylum seekers from non-EU countries. In 2019, EU-internal migration remained on place one in Germany (748.994 persons), while the number of first-time asylum seekers from non-EU countries stood at place 2 with 142.509 persons. Higher education migration takes up the third place (110.974 persons in 2019) and family unification ranges on place four (96.633 persons in 2019 – a number that nearly doubled in relation to 2010). Labour migration is on place 5 with 64.219 persons in 2019, but gained more importance in comparison to 2010.<sup>16</sup>

Of those who migrated based on a labour visa, citizens of Western Balkans countries range first in 2019: the highest number is from Bosnia-Herzegovina, followed by Serbia, Kosovo, Northern Macedonia and Albania. USA, Turkey, India and Japan come next.<sup>17</sup>

While labour migrants from the Western Balkans largely do not have a labour qualification (which is also a speciality of the Western Balkans regulation, as it allows citizens of these countries to take up labour without the necessary qualification as soon as they can prove a job offer)<sup>18</sup>, India, Turkey and the Russian Federation and China lead the statistics of countries sending migrants with higher qualification, the so-called blue card holders.<sup>19</sup>

In September 2015, at the heights of the so-called “refugee crisis”, when large numbers of refugees crossed the Mediterranean and moved further north by taking the so-called Balkan route, Germany surprised the international world by opening its borders for refugees, de facto

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<sup>15</sup> Eurostat 2019, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/digpub/eumove/bloc-2c.html?lang=en>

<sup>16</sup> BAMF-Bericht (2019): Tabelle 1-2: Wanderungen zwischen Deutschland1 und dem Ausland von 1950 bis 2019. S. 261.

<sup>17</sup> BAMF-Bericht (2019): Tabelle 1-2: Wanderungen zwischen Deutschland1 und dem Ausland von 1950 bis 2019. S. 261.

<sup>18</sup> BAMF-Bericht (2019): Tabelle 3-22: Erwerbsmigration von hochqualifizierten Fachkräften nach § 19a AufenthG (Blaue Karte EU) nach den häufigsten Staatsangehörigkeiten (Einreise im jeweiligen Berichtsjahr, S. 262 BAMF-Bericht (2019): Tabelle 3-23:

<sup>19</sup> Erwerbsmigration von Hochqualifizierten nach § 19a AufenthG (Blaue Karte EU) im Jahr 2019 nach den häufigsten Staatsangehörigkeiten, Art der Beschäftigung und Geschlecht, S. 263

suspending the Dublin III regulation. This went hand in hand with a “welcome culture” towards arriving refugees, which was brought forward by a large part of the population as well as media. This was followed by the famous and often repeated expression of Chancellor Angela Merkel “Wir schaffen das” (“we make it”).<sup>20</sup>

However, there were increasingly also concerns for the security and social cohesion of the German society, as well as of the capacity of the welfare state, also because of the large number of refugees who registered in Germany in 2015, which reached up to 800.000 in that year and continued to be relatively high in early 2016 and which was increasingly framed as a “migration and refugee crisis”.<sup>21</sup> In this climate, the right-conservative party AfD (Alternative for Germany) managed to gain influence with refugee hostile and racist voices. The AfD had been founded in 2013 as a reaction to the measures to fight the “European financial crisis” and soon raised obstructive voices in relation to immigration.<sup>22</sup> In 2017, the AfD became the third largest party in the federal elections and entered the German parliament by tripling its votes.<sup>23</sup>

Although the success of the AfD definitely changed the public climate and polarized the public debate on immigration, the differentiated but still largely positive attitudes and opinions regarding migration issues and welcoming culture within the population build the majority, e.g. by regarding migration as an opportunity, especially for the labour market (see Integration Barometer of the Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration (SUR), as well as a study of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES)<sup>24</sup>. However, the majority also sees the challenges of immigration and often regards an increase in cultural and religious pluralism as a

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<sup>20</sup> Ulrich Herbert, Jakob Schönhagen, 17.07.2020: [Vor dem 5. September. Die "Flüchtlingskrise" 2015 im historischen Kontext | APuZ \(bpb.de\)](#)

<sup>21</sup> Ulrich Herbert, Jakob Schönhagen, 17.07.2020: [Vor dem 5. September. Die "Flüchtlingskrise" 2015 im historischen Kontext | APuZ \(bpb.de\)](#)

<sup>22</sup> Ulrich Herbert, Jakob Schönhagen, 17.07.2020: [Vor dem 5. September. Die "Flüchtlingskrise" 2015 im historischen Kontext | APuZ \(bpb.de\)](#)

<sup>23</sup> Frank decker, 16.10.2020: [Kurz und bündig: Die AfD | Parteien in Deutschland | bpb](#)

<sup>24</sup> Faus, Rainer/Storks, Simon: Das pragmatische Einwanderungsland – Was die Deutschen über Migration denken. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Berlin 2019.



threat to the social cohesion - even if this correlation cannot be supported by scientific evidence (see Bertelsmann Foundation 2018<sup>25</sup>).<sup>26</sup>

Germany - like many other countries - has imposed far-reaching entry restrictions due to the Corona pandemic. This leads to fewer people migrating.

In the second quarter of 2020, the immigration of skilled workers has nearly come to a standstill – not at least because the visa offices abroad worked to a limited extent or because of the impossibility to catch a plane. This is the case despite the new law for skilled labour immigration (coming into effect on March 1, 2020 in order to facilitate the immigration of skilled workers from non-EU countries). This again leads – among others - to gaps at the labour market – especially in sectors with a high percentage of migrant workers, like in home care for the elderly (it is estimated that between 300.000 and 500.000, mostly Polish, care workers from abroad work in German private households every year), agriculture (according to industry figures, around 300.000 seasonal workers, mostly from Eastern Europe, work there every year), construction sites (around 100.000 posted workers work there every year, mainly from Eastern Europe).<sup>27</sup>

In principle, it is possible to enter Germany from another EU state and the Schengen area. However, based on the risk assessment by Covid-19 classification of the sending region, those who enter may need to prove a negative Covid-19 test and/or have to go into quarantine. Those originating from a region with very high incidence numbers or with highly infectious variants of Covid-19 are banned from entering. Still, there are also exceptions to the travel restrictions for various groups of people based on their relevance for the economy and society (for example for commuters in system-relevant occupational sectors from Austria and the Czech Republic), because of their German nationality or because of personal (family or health) reasons, and in part also exceptions for cross border commuters.

As an effect of the Covid-19 pandemic, also the number of persons seeking protection in Germany and more generally the EU has dropped considerably in 2020 – despite the declaration of the

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<sup>25</sup> Menschen in Deutschland überzeugt: Bürgersinn hängt nicht von der Herkunft ab (bertelsmann-stiftung.de)

<sup>26</sup> BAMF (o.A.): Deutschland kann Integration: [https://www.integrationsbeauftragte.de/resource/blob/89600/1699390/478a6d7d9cd3fc2c18131ebfcfef3dac/lage;\\_bericht-12-data.pdf](https://www.integrationsbeauftragte.de/resource/blob/89600/1699390/478a6d7d9cd3fc2c18131ebfcfef3dac/lage;_bericht-12-data.pdf) p. 46

<sup>27</sup> [Wegen Corona: Fachkräfteeinwanderung liegt auf Eis - trotz neuem Gesetz \(rnd.de\)](https://www.rnd.de/wirtschaft/Wegen-Corona-Fachkräfteeinwanderung-liegt-auf-Eis-trotz-neuem-Gesetz-rnd.de)

Federal Ministry of the Interior in March 2020 that these persons are not turned away at German borders and are in principle exempt from entry restrictions. According to statistics from the EU's asylum agency, the number of people who applied for asylum dropped around 30% in the period from January to November 2020 compared to the same period a year earlier. Only one fourth of the promised quota of 5.500 refugees which Germany wanted to take under the "resettlement" procedure in 2020 were allowed to enter in 2020 (1.369 persons), and in family reunion programs for persons with a subsidiary protection, numbers have dropped considerably in 2020, too.

For migrants and refugees residing within Germany, the Pandemic had negative effects, too. Refugees in collective accommodations have an especially high risk to infect themselves with COVID-19 because social distancing is difficult. The difficult health and health care situation of undocumented migrants increased with Covid-19. Migrants and refugees are also especially affected by unemployment, as they are more likely to work in sectors that are particularly affected by the crisis, such as hotels and restaurants. In addition, migrants are more likely to be in temporary jobs.<sup>28</sup>

## **NATIONAL POLICIES AND STRATEGIES IN THE FIELD OF MIGRATION AND MIGRANT INTEGRATION**

According to a publication of the Expert Council of German Foundations for Integration and Migration from 2014, Germany had turned into a 'modern immigration country' within the previous 15 years.<sup>29</sup> An important achievement in this regard was the reform of the law on nationality in 1999/2000, according to which the place of birth (*ius soli*) became decisive in the granting of German citizenship for the first time, disregarding the citizenship of the parents (but still depending on the length of their legal stay in Germany). Until that time, the *ius sanguis*, in which the citizenship of the parents is the decisive principle for granting citizenship had been the ruling principle in Germany.

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<sup>28</sup> See for all information provided here: Corona-Pandemie und Migration: <https://mediendienst-integration.de/migration/corona-pandemie.html>

<sup>29</sup> VR (2014): Deutschlands Wandel zum modernen Einwanderungsland. Jahresgutachten 2014 mit Integrationsbarometer, Berlin [http://www.svr-migration.de/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/SVR\\_JG\\_2014\\_WEB.pdf](http://www.svr-migration.de/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/SVR_JG_2014_WEB.pdf);

SVR (2015): Unter Einwanderungsländern: Deutschland im internationalen Vergleich. Jahresgutachten 2015, Berlin [https://www.stiftung-mercator.de/media/downloads/3\\_Publikationen/SVR\\_Jahresgutachten2015\\_150427](https://www.stiftung-mercator.de/media/downloads/3_Publikationen/SVR_Jahresgutachten2015_150427).

Furthermore, in the year 2000, also a so-called German 'Green Card' ('Ordinance on Work Permits for Highly Qualified Foreign Professionals in Information and Communication Technology'), a work permit for skilled workers from Third Countries in the fields of information and communication technology (ICT) was introduced. With the Immigration Act (ZuwG) in 2005, the federal government recognised the fundamental necessity of labour migration for Germany for the first time since the recruitment stop in 1973. This led to the opening the labour market for foreign graduates of German universities. and the Immigration Act for 'particularly highly qualified persons' (§ 19 AufenthG) and self-employed persons (§ 21 AufenthG), opening up a permanent life perspective in Germany via the settlement permit.

In 2007 and 2009, the Directive Implementation Act, the Higher Education Graduates' Access Ordinance and the Labour Migration Tax Act created further access opportunities for third-country nationals to the German labour market. In the frame of this act, among others, the priority check (determining whether Germans, EU citizens or other nationals with preferential rights are available for a job) for foreign graduates of German universities when looking for a job was abolished. The new regulations for foreign students also led to a considerable increase in the number of foreign students which begin their studies in Germany, from 53,554 (2006) to 99,087 (2015) (more than two-thirds of them third-country nationals).

This opening up of Germany to highly qualified professionals from third countries was continued in 2012 as part of the implementation of the EU Highly Qualified Workers Directive (Blue Card Directive). In the context of issuing the Blue Card, a possible priority check for German citizens was dispensed and the minimum salary limits were set as low as possible under EU law. At the same time, Section 18c of the Residence Act was introduced, which allows academics from third countries to come to Germany for up to six months to look for a job. With this, Germany broke with the dogma of proving an employment contract as a prerequisite for a residence permit, which had been the guiding principle for decades.

Another fundamental change in German labour migration policy was initiated in 2013 by the reform of the Employment Ordinance, which enabled the immigration of non-academically trained skilled workers. On this basis, third-country nationals in so-called shortage occupations (currently e.g. occupations in mechatronics, electrical engineering, nursing and elderly care) whose professional qualifications have been recognised in Germany, could immigrate to Germany.

Furthermore, opportunities for post-qualification in Germany (Section 17a of the Residence Act) for people without full recognition of their vocational training were created.

In 2015/16, Germany also ratified the so-called Western Balkans arrangement, according to which citizens from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Northern Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia were able to obtain a residence permit for employment without a recognised qualification: they only needed to present a concrete job offer or an employment contract. The period for this arrangement has been extended to 2023.<sup>30</sup>

Despite all these liberal amendments of the immigration law, according to which Germany entered the group of the most open OECD countries in the area of labour migration policy, in 2018, only just under 40,000 people with a university degree or completed vocational training came to Germany from countries outside the European Union. Strategic measures for the targeted recruitment of certain occupational groups from abroad remained very limited until now.

Especially in the area of highly qualified employment, labour migration to Germany is up to date based on mainly inner EU immigration. In 2018 alone, more than 600.000 people immigrated from other EU countries – likely about 50 percent of them in order to work in Germany, and a large proportion of them highly qualified and working as skilled workers.<sup>31</sup> Many of them also came due to the mass unemployment caused by the economic and financial crisis from 2008 on. The occupational mobility of young people within Europe was supported the "MobiPro-EU" programme launched in 2013 by the federal government. This program was used by more than 10,000 young people already in the first two years and included the starting of in-company vocational trainings in Germany.

The small numbers of skilled workers coming to Germany from Third Countries led to numerous pleas for further amendments and relaxations of German regulations in the area of labour migration in order to ensure that companies can recruit and employ skilled third-country nationals.<sup>32</sup> They resulted in the Skilled Workers Immigration Act, which came into effect in March 2020. On the basis of this Act, the legal position of skilled workers with vocational training has been equalized with that of skilled workers with a university degree. Now, persons with both kinds

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<sup>30</sup> [BAMF - Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge - Fachkräfte mit Berufsausbildung](#)

<sup>31</sup> Holger Kolb, 1.12.2020: ['Make it in Germany' – das Fachkräfteeinwanderungsgesetz | bpb](#)

<sup>32</sup> ['See: Make it in Germany' – das Fachkräfteeinwanderungsgesetz | bpb](#)

of qualifications receive the opportunity to come to Germany for six months to look for a job and can stay on as soon as they find a job with adequate qualifications. Furthermore, labour immigration to Germany is now open to all occupations, provided migrants can prove an employment contract. Last but not at least, the Skilled Workers Immigration Act expands the opportunities to come to Germany to enhance the qualification, for example, for further education and training. Those who finished education and professional qualifications are allowed to stay and work in Germany.<sup>33</sup>

### **Forced migration**

In the field of persons seeking protection, Germany introduced a couple of more restrictive measures for immigration, while at the same time opening up the labour market for asylum seekers with “good prospects of staying” and rewarding their successful integration. Following the high influx of refugees to Germany in 2015, these measures aimed at reducing the number of asylum seekers, speeding up asylum procedures and promoting social integration processes of asylum seekers with good prospects of staying and recognised refugees.

In October 2015, the federal government passed the Asylum Package I ("Asylum Procedure Acceleration Act"), followed by the Asylum Package II ("Act on the Introduction of Accelerated Asylum Procedures") on 25 February 2016. Within these packages, it was agreed that asylum seekers from “safe countries of origin”, but also asylum seekers who cannot present valid identity papers, will in future be accommodated in special reception facilities, the so-called arrival centres, where decisions on their asylum applications would be made in a fast-track procedure. Moreover, this law provides that for persons who had received a subsidiary protection instead of a full refugee title – a percentage that raised sharply - family reunification was banned for two years. This was a political measure to reduce the number of joining family members – even if the right to family established a human right.<sup>34</sup> When in August 2018 the ban on family reunifications for persons with subsidiary protection was finally lifted, a new law was introduced which granted family unification on the basis of proving humanitarian reasons only. Furthermore, family reunification was bound to a quota of 1000 persons per month, which could however not be

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<sup>33</sup> Hoger Kolb, 2020: 'Make it in Germany' – das Fachkräfteeinwanderungsgesetz | bpb

<sup>34</sup> Vera Hanewinkel: Migrationspolitik - Februar 2016 | bpb

reached until now due to complicated procedures and long waiting times in overburdened administrations.<sup>35</sup>

In the summer of 2019, the Federal Government passed – together with the Skilled Workers Immigration Act - also the so-called Orderly Return Act, which aimed at creating a legal framework to deport those who do not have the right to stay in Germany.<sup>36</sup>

### **Integration Policies**

While Germany increasingly regards itself as a country of (labour) immigration, which corresponds to the manifold changes in the legal sphere easing especially labour migration, it slowly but surely also tries to develop of a corresponding culture of welcome and recognition for immigrants.<sup>37</sup> This path was however not straight forward.

From the 1950s all up to the 1990s, the integration policy of the Federal Republic of Germany (Western Germany) was based on two columns: So-called “Aussiedler”, immigrants who were recognised as 'Germans' from the areas of the former 'Eastern Bloc', benefited from comprehensive integration assistance since the 1950s. Non-German labour migrants, on the other hand, who entered Germany from the 1950s, too, were perceived as 'guest workers' who would not stay permanently, as durable immigration and integration policies were limited to ethnic Germans only. Even after the recruitment stop in 1973, which resulted in manifold family reunifications in Germany, the federal government hardly supported the wide participation of migrants in the German society, but rather invested into migrants' ability to return' (e.g., by offering migrant children training in their mother language). In the 1980s and 1990s, the policy of multiculturalism promoted the acceptance of so perceived cultural differences, while however hardly reducing the ethnicised social layering of the German society, which was a result of the long term lack of integration policies.

Since Nine Eleven (2001), the concept of integration was increasingly culturalized, i.e., the cultural compatibility of migrants, their cultural adaptation, and their religious convictions suddenly gained attention, leading to an “othering” of migrants along cultural lines.

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<sup>35</sup> Sebastian Muy, 14.11.2019: [Familiennachzug zu Flüchtlingen: Regierung erreicht Ziele nicht \(migazin.de\)](#)

<sup>36</sup> Holger Kolb, 1.12.2020: ['See: Make it in Germany' – das Fachkräfteeinwanderungsgesetz | bpb](#)

<sup>37</sup> Holger Kolb, 14.05.2018: [Der liberale Wandel der deutschen Arbeitsmigrationspolitik seit 2000 | bpb](#)

Still, with the Immigration Act of 2005, also integration policies and measures focussing on structural aspects such as language learning, education, work or housing and aiming at the better integration of immigrants (including second generation migrants), have become an integral part of federal and state policy.

The establishment of professional organisations such as the *Rat für Migration* (Council for Migration) or the *Sachverständigenrat Integration und Migration* (The German Council of Experts on Integration and Migration) (SVR) contribute to this development. Commissions or summits developed integration measures and involved research as well as civil society organisations in this process. At the federal level, important guidelines for the operationalisation of integration measures were define by the National Action Plan on Integration.

Social scientists and civil society activists coined the term post-migrant society in order to raise attention that people with a migration background had become active actors on all levels of German society – a process that should be further supported in order to enhance the cultural-social, structural and political integration. At the same time, the term called for a shift in perspective: Integration policies were not limited to the process of integrating "foreigners" into the existing system, but were rather to involve all residents (as in fact, citizens without a migration background could fall out of the system, too, and could refuse to open themselves up to the transforming society). As such, measures have to be found in which participation of all people can be organised in as many areas of life as possible and thereby meet the demands of everyone. For that, also a new narrative for the German society should be created.<sup>38</sup>

Migrants without German citizenship cannot vote in federal elections. Participating in the elections of the country of their citizenship is generally based on either travelling to the country of origin, or applying for an absentee ballot within the diplomatic representation of this country in the country of residency, if this possibility is provided. In 2014, Turkish citizens in Germany had for the first time in history the chance to cast a ballot for Turkish elections in Germany. German double citizenship holders can generally vote in both countries.

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<sup>38</sup> All information of this section from: Marc-Philipp Nogueira, 14.05.2018: [Integrationsdebatten und -politik \(bpb.de\)](#); Naika Foroutan, 20.04.2015: [Die postmigrantische Gesellschaft | bpb](#)

Since 2010, children born in Germany to foreign parents are granted dual (or triple) citizenship as soon as the parents legally reside at least eight years in Germany.<sup>39</sup> However, if the other citizenships aren't from EU countries or Switzerland, children have to decide for one citizenship and give up the other(s) when they turn 18 years. Generally, Germany follows the principle that double citizenships should be avoided. When naturalising Third Country foreigners, they are therefore required to give up the citizenship of their country of origin in favour of German citizenship. If the country of origin does not provide for a release from citizenship or regularly refuses to do, the continued existence of dual citizenships may however also be tolerated. EU citizens and citizens of Switzerland as well as recognised refugees do not have to give up their first citizenship when naturalising in Germany.<sup>40</sup>

Next to return programs faced at high skill emigrants such as scientists, other specific policies or programmes addressing/attracting diasporic communities residing abroad are not known to the authors.

In order for Germany to become not just an immigration society, but also an integration society, it is necessary for politics and the public to deal with how societal norms can be shaped in such a way that they grant everyone the same rights and at the same time guarantee fair opportunities for structural participation.<sup>41</sup> A further challenge is the strong focus on labour migration following neoliberal policy – now without proving a lack of workforce within Germany -, which may also lead to further competition on the labour market and wage dumping. This already happened with inner-EU labour migration, as salaries in migrant dominated fields of labour are considerably lower than the average. This pressures migrants (especially from Romania) to have a mobile life and again hinders their integration in other domains of society (cultural, social, educational, political representation), Also for other migration pathways (asylum claims and family reunification), which have been formerly strictly separated from labour migration, meritocratic perspectives and the demand for integration which is in the responsibility of the individual migrant increasingly gain space. For family reunification, applicants abroad have to prove their

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<sup>39</sup> Fatima Rebeggiani, 2013: [Deutschland: Migrationspolitische Ergebnisse des Koalitionsvertrags | bpb](#)  
See also [Staatsangehörigkeit - Deine Rechte \(jugendnetz.de\)](#)

<sup>40</sup> [Doppelte Staatsbürgerschaft | bpb](#)

<sup>41</sup> See Marc-Philipp Nogueira, 14.05.2018: [Integrationsdebatten und -politik \(bpb.de\)](#)



capacities to integrate into German society by proving the knowledge of basic German even before migration, and sponsors have to prove their capacities to provide for themselves and their family members. Generally, human rights (be it to find protection from political prosecution by applying for asylum or be it to live with family) increasingly become an issue of negotiation and a question of layered humanitarian grounds.

### **Key actors responsible for the implementation of the migration policies**

- **Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees) BAMF (national level)**

The Federal Office decides on asylum applications and protection against deportation for refugees in the Federal Republic of Germany. After being admitted to Germany, the Federal Office supports immigrants by promoting and coordinating their linguistic, social and societal integration. In addition, the Federal Office helps with the distribution of Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union.

[BAMF - Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge - Startseite](#)

- **Die Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration (Federal Government Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration) (national level)**

The Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration supports the Federal Government in further developing integration policy and promoting the coexistence of all people in the country - whether Germans or foreigners, with or without an immigration history.

[Amt und Person \(integrationsbeauftragte.de\)](#)

- **Fachkommission Integrationsfähigkeit (Expert commission for integration capacity) (national level)**

It develops standards on how to improve integration in the labour market and in society.

[Fachkommission Integrationsfähigkeit \(fachkommission-integrationsfaehigkeit.de\)](#)

- **Sachverständigenrat Integration und Migration (The German Council of Experts on Integration and Migration) (SVR)**

SVR is an independent, interdisciplinary body of experts that provides policy-oriented advice and factual information to the public. Every year, the nine experts present an annual report and comment on current developments in the fields of integration and migration.

[Sachverständigenrat für Integration und Migration gGmbH \(svr-migration.de\)](http://svr-migration.de)

- **Rat für Migration (The Council for Migration) (RfM)**

It is a nationwide association of around 170 academics from various disciplines who conduct research on migration and integration issues.

<https://rat-fuer-migration.de/>

- **Informationszentrum Asyl und Migration (Information Centre Asylum and Migration) (BAMF)**

The Information Centre for Asylum and Migration (IZAM) is the central specialised information facility of the Federal Office. It provides comprehensive information on migrants' countries of origin, transit and reception as well as on migration events.

[BAMF - Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge - Informationszentrum Asyl und Migration](http://bamf.de)

- **Research Centre Migration, Integration and Asylum (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees)**

In line with the core tasks of the Federal Office in the field of migration and integration, research analyses the impact of migration processes on the Federal Republic of Germany and provides insights for the management of migration at the national level. In addition, the research area accompanies the process of integration of people with a migration background in Germany.

- **Ausländerbehörde (Foreigners Office) (regional level)**

Task: enforcing the law on foreigners

- **Integration advisory councils/foreigners' advisory councils of the Municipalities (regional/local level)**

For people with a migration background without German citizenship, the elected integration advisory councils/foreigners' advisory councils and representations are of great importance at the municipal level. Their purpose is to articulate the interests of the foreign population and bring them into local politics.<sup>42</sup>

- **German Centre for Integration and Migration Research (DeZIM)**

Founded in 2017, it conducts research on integration and migration as well as on consensus and conflict, on social participation and on racism. DeZIM is based on two pillars: the DeZIM Institute and the DeZIM Research Community.

[www.dezim-institut.de/](http://www.dezim-institut.de/)

## **Good practices in local contexts concerning migration management**

Regional companies of all sizes in the skilled crafts sector as well as industry and commerce face particular challenges in the supply of skilled workers. In the competition for personnel, more and more companies are also looking at the potential of refugees. The need to match refugees and asylum seekers and companies has been translated into several projects run by regional players, such as the Chambers of Commerce in Industry or the chamber of Crafts.

The following chapter present some best practices that meet this need:

1) The local Chambers' education center (IHK-Projektgesellschaft) in Frankfurt/Oder manages a project called "Bleibnet Pro Quali für Brandenburg" targeted to Asylum seekers and refugees aged between 18 - 65 years, who have at least subordinate access to the labour market

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<sup>42</sup> Deutschland kann Integration: Potenziale fördern, Integration fördern, Zusammenhalt stärken. ([integrationsbeauftragte.de](http://integrationsbeauftragte.de)) S. 286

and are looking for work or are in precarious employment. The project can be considered as best practice which is underpinned by several extensions since 2015. Activities implemented include for example placing participants in language courses, supporting the recognition of certificates, assisting with job applications, consulting SMEs on promotion and recruitment issues and implementing competence assessments (see: <https://www.ihk-projekt.de/bleibnet-pro-quali/>).

2) As the Chambers are the competent body for dual apprenticeship training, they put additional efforts to competences assessment in order to sustainably integrate adults with migration background and existing vocational competences. One service of the Chamber of Commerce Eastern Brandenburg is an individual initial consultation before the process of the official assessment procedure to check the equivalence of a specific foreign qualification with the corresponding occupation in Germany (centralized at IHK FOSA). The advisor at the chamber will go through all the documents with the applicant and help determine the correct German vocational qualification with which to make the comparison.

3) With regards to offering broad chance for an official recognition, another successful project called "Competence Assessment and Qualification in the Dual Sector" is aimed at people whose vocational qualifications from abroad in dual training occupations have only been partially recognized in the course of the recognition procedure or who have received a rejection notice. Its' concept is to identify and offer individual needs and coordinated further training measures that target participants towards a vocational qualification recognized in Germany (see: <https://www.ihk-projekt.de/anpassungsqualifizierung/>).

4) The Chamber of Crafts installed a "welcome guide" aiming at companies and refugees interested in the skilled trades, who seeks to fill training positions and jobs with a perfect fit. The aim of the project is to sensitise craft companies to the possibility of securing skilled labour from among refugees and to advise them on all practical questions of integrating refugees into companies through job shadowing, internships, entry-level qualification, training or work.

## **READINESS OF HEI GRADUATES FOR WORK IN THE FIELD OF MIGRATION AND MIGRANT INTEGRATION**

Generally, the interest of students in HEI in topics of migration and integration is strong. This finds entry into the 17 study programs at HEI in the realm of migration and integration, and reflects the strong position of immigration and migration in public discourses in society. At the European University of Viadrina, such courses are highly asked for and students are enthusiastic – among them students with a migration background. Most of such courses as well as HEI programs are offered in social and cultural sciences, which take a critical perspective into the topic, and in which the percentage of female students dominate.

Based on our survey on HEI programs in topics of migration and integration and the job market for these graduates, here are various professional fields that offer jobs for HEI graduates trained in these fields. These jobs entail the field of social work, e.g., in collective accommodation centres for asylum seekers, or within communities and schools, as well as in local administrations. Within these fields and on communal level, these jobs are however often not well paid, while at the same time there is often a pronounced hierarchy between professionals and their clients.

International organisations offer another interesting professional sector for HEI graduates trained in the field of migration. Offering jobs outside of Germany, these jobs largely promise a higher salary and a more cosmopolitan professional environment and life style. Here again, gaps appear between local staff and international employees, the latter often taking up the more powerful and much better paid positions within the organisation.

Further fields are politics and research, as well as foundations, and increasingly also bigger firms and companies which employ a highly diverse workforce and which want to optimise this diversity and the conditions foreign employees meet in order to attract adequate workforce from abroad.

As migrants within Germany come from very different regional and social contexts, it would be desirable that students enlarge their experiences with diversity and backgrounds by studying at different partner universities in migration sending or transit countries especially in the Global South, as well as in the Eastern Europe. As Eastern and South-eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union including Eurasia are regions from which many migrants in Germany origin (who came in the 1990s especially “Aussiedler”, but who how increasingly come also as labour migrants

based on the Western Balkan arrangement from 2016 on and the Skilled Workers Immigration Act from 2020 on), the geographic focus on Eastern Europe and Eurasia within study programs on migration and migrant integration is very valuable. Furthermore, an internship at the time of studying – in Germany or also abroad – would be helpful, too, in order to familiarize students with job market requirements and to achieve practical skills.

HEI study programs in the field of migration and migrant integration should train students in the frameworks of the very different fields of migration – ranging from labour migration to higher education migration, family migration and forced migration – and the interrelations and entanglements between them. Here lines are increasingly blurred, not just among families and migrant communities, but also in the structural approach of migration policy programs. The neoliberal aspects of evaluating and enhancing migration in terms of its economic gain for society, which also entails the plea for self-optimization of the individual migrant in order to integrate smoothly into society (and the job market), are increasingly paramount. This becomes obvious when asylum seekers are increasingly also integrated into the job market and need to prove their integration efforts in order to enhance their chances to stay, or when higher education migrants are offered the possibility to stay on for a job search, and generally, when migrants can gain residency as soon as they prove that they have been successful on the job market.

HEI graduates need to receive a good overview about the different migration policies, their normative backgrounds (e.g., be it human rights or labour market considerations), aims and their interrelations, as well as the global connections, and shall at the same time being able to look beyond the political frames and open the perspective to the humans behind such programs, and their different backgrounds and needs. The interlinkages of different scales of analysis, from the global to the national and regional/local to the personal and interpersonal, seems to be paramount.

As migration is managed by a border regime, first of all at the EU external borders, where migrants are categorized and their movement is filtered, and but also by and within the different nation states, in which migrants meet diverse legal and social boundaries and are differentially included, a border study approach is very helpful in order to understand the dynamics of border and boundary drawings, shifting and crossings, as well as the reconfiguration of social orders along the management of migration.

Furthermore, students need to be trained in critical self-reflection. Within migration and integration directed professions (in social work and administration), migrants and more generally the clients are often regarded as coping with immigrant specific “deficits” or problems, which may also cause problems to the larger society, which need to be overcome and optimized. Within such logic, employees in these fields regard themselves as professionally and normatively supporting such processes, which again creates a power hierarchy in which migrants occupy the lower position and as recipients of support. According to newer concepts of integration, migrants shall however be regarded as active and resourceful agents within society, and integration programs shall also involve citizens without a migration background. While such approaches gain space in social work programs, schools and administration, there is still a lot to do and programs have to be adapted according to such approaches. The focus of bringing more diversity into job sectors in which diversity was so far underrepresented – especially in administration -, would be surely a good strategy. Despite Germany’s focus on labour migration in order to enhance economically competitiveness on the global market, migrants have to be also regarded as active agents of society beyond the work place, and the opening of the society in these different fields seems paramount and as such affects all segments of society. Here, students need to be trained in innovative approaches of creating a postmigrant society and learn methods how to enhance the intercultural opening of social institutions and governmental organisations within Germany, to overcome social boundaries and to strengthen postmigrant societal models.

Associated partners for further education, such as the Chambers (of Industry, Commerce and Crafts) and their training departments need to strategically recruit personnel for the topic of migration. Their field of work include different tasks and responsibilities, depending on the objectives pursued with a specific service. These can be activities such as

- consulting migrants on how to enter the labour market, i.e. preparing necessary documents, preparation for job interviews, searching suitable job/training offers;
- conducting competence assessments, both at theoretical and practical level, with additional support of vocational experts, i.e. with an introduction session, organizing appointments with vocational experts, observing performances;

- organizing adaptation trainings, both at VET providers and in-company based, i.e. consulting suitable targets, conducting competence assessments and sector specific language courses German directly at the workplace;
- consulting companies regarding migrant integration as employees, i.e. what to consider from a legal perspective, how to find suitable qualified employees, how to be sure that the potential employee is qualified for a certain job, how to ease the intercultural immersion (also by making sure he/she gets a good command of German), how to provide additional training at the workplace etc..

From the NGOs/ associated partners for further education point of view, HEI graduates involved in services related to migration need at least a good command of English, preferably also knowledge of a second and third foreign language, in particular Polish especially for migration issues in the East Brandenburg region and cross-border cooperation and maybe Arabic or Farsi. They need intercultural competences, preferably acquired through own experiences, ie. working with the target group in internships or part-time student contracts before. Relevant soft skills, such as communication and collaboration skills, openness, sensitivity, patience, resilience, initiative and self-awareness as well as content-related skills on respective regulations concerning the status of refugees or their integration into the labour market, are required to meet the demands in this field of work.

Further soft skills to be pointed out are the ability to establish and maintain high-level contacts with cooperation partners and companies (as potential employers of migrants), establish networks with responsible entities in the region and to implement joint projects in a targeted manner.

Further to that digital competences are required, for example to be able to research supporting measures, job vacancies and funds online, to get a quick overview of what is offered, to (de)select information and put them into the right context as well as knowledge on relevant, migration-related internet portals and websites. Due to the strong impact of social media, a competent handling of social media tools and platforms helps to establish networks and foster a good communication to the target group and actors involved.

From an NGO point of view training needs for personnel occur in terms of knowledge of funding opportunities in the country, knowledge of wages and training allowance structures as part of



labour market issues, knowing the relevant contact person at Chambers in case of questions on training/job placements, intercultural competences and de-escalation training.

## CONCLUSION

In Germany, employment in the field of migrant integration is often related to social work, which is also supported by the emerging study programs on migration and social work offered at different Universities of Applied Sciences with a focus on social work, and especially in BA programs.

The majority of study programs in the thematic scope of migration, diaspora and border studies are offered on MA level (10 out of 17) and various of them at full universities. As such, they offer a specialization on migration and integration at a higher education level, while graduates are simultaneously likely to also feed into the more diversified job market in various different branches, among others in politics, public service, profit-oriented and non-profit oriented companies and international organisations / relations. Within these study programs, social and cultural sciences are the leading subjects, which support a critical understanding of migration and integration and its entanglement within the overall society and global processes.

The 17 universities in Germany which offer altogether 17 study programs on BA and MA-level in the thematic scope of migration, diaspora and border studies have a strongly interdisciplinary approach. The interdisciplinary approach is surely needed, as the management of migration and integration invokes all three fields: social (and cultural) sciences, law and economics.

At the same time, the focus is on social and cultural sciences, while law, economic and security (technology) studies are less taken into account, although the German migration and integration management is a field which is largely directed by economic needs analysis and the securitization of the EU and the national border and migration regime. It may thus be asked if HEI programs on migration and migrant integration should not increasingly integrate such fields in an interdisciplinary and critical perspective. As the categorization of migrants and the diversification of their rights is a very important mechanism in the management of migration and the design of supporting programs – from the control of physical movement to the mechanisms of in- and

exclusion within the German society - an interdisciplinary border study perspective could be an important transversal approach to different forms of migration control.

Most migration-based study programs lack an integrated border study perspective, although this could improve an understanding for the social boundaries migrants meet as well mechanisms of categorization and mobility control.

The proposed study program needs an interdisciplinary approach that should entail social and cultural as well as legal and economic sciences.

Furthermore, the training in an understanding of migration-based factors in sending and transit countries in an entangled perspective, the historical legacy, as well as the training of language competences are often lacking or play only a minor role.

Students need to be trained in a self-reflexive approach which puts migration and integration into the center of society, and which involves all parts of society into the task of creating a “postmigrant” society.

Degree programmes provide a basic knowledge in the fields of migration and border studies. As NGOs, migration counselling providers, mediators, etc. are embedded in different contexts (regional labour market, rural vs. urban areas, population composition, etc.), students need further knowledge and skills. Here, transversal skills, as presented in the report, are also important.

## APPENDIX

Migrationsbericht (2010) – BAMF

<https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Forschung/Migrationsberichte/migrationsbericht-2010.pdf? blob=publicationFile>

Migrationsbericht (2011) – BAMF

<https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Forschung/Migrationsberichte/migrationsbericht-2011.pdf? blob=publicationFile&v=15>

Migrationsbericht (2012) – BAMF

<https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Forschung/Migrationsberichte/migrationsbericht-2012.pdf? blob=publicationFile&v=13>

Migrationsbericht (2013) – BAMF

[https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Forschung/Migrationsberichte/migrationsbericht-2013.pdf;jsessionid=5612D0D43530DDE268C06098B8E06452.internet541?\\_blob=publicationFile&v=13](https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Forschung/Migrationsberichte/migrationsbericht-2013.pdf;jsessionid=5612D0D43530DDE268C06098B8E06452.internet541?_blob=publicationFile&v=13)

Migrationsbericht (2014) – BAMF

[https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Forschung/Migrationsberichte/migrationsbericht-2014.pdf?\\_blob=publicationFile](https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Forschung/Migrationsberichte/migrationsbericht-2014.pdf?_blob=publicationFile)

Migrationsbericht (2015) – BAMF

[https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Forschung/Migrationsberichte/migrationsbericht-2015.pdf?\\_blob=publicationFile](https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Forschung/Migrationsberichte/migrationsbericht-2015.pdf?_blob=publicationFile)

Migrationsbericht (2016/2017) – BAMF

[https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Forschung/Migrationsberichte/migrationsbericht-2016-2017.pdf?\\_blob=publicationFile](https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Forschung/Migrationsberichte/migrationsbericht-2016-2017.pdf?_blob=publicationFile)

Migrationsbericht (2018) – BAMF

[https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Forschung/Migrationsberichte/migrationsbericht-2018.pdf?\\_blob=publicationFile&v=6](https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Forschung/Migrationsberichte/migrationsbericht-2018.pdf?_blob=publicationFile&v=6) )

**Migrationsbericht (2019) – BAMF**

[https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Forschung/Migrationsberichte/migrationsbericht-2019.pdf?\\_blob=publicationFile&v=11](https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Forschung/Migrationsberichte/migrationsbericht-2019.pdf?_blob=publicationFile&v=11)

**Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit – Destatis**

[https://www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/Gesellschaft-Umwelt/Bevoelkerung/Migration-Integration/Publikationen/Downloads-Migration/auslaend-bevoelkerung-2010200197004.pdf?\\_blob=publicationFile](https://www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/Gesellschaft-Umwelt/Bevoelkerung/Migration-Integration/Publikationen/Downloads-Migration/auslaend-bevoelkerung-2010200197004.pdf?_blob=publicationFile)

- a. Number of foreigners residing in your country and their structure according to:
  - type of residence (work permission, studies, family reunification, ...)
    - BAMF-Bericht (2019): Tabelle 3-20: Zuwanderungsgruppen seit 1991, S. 261
  - country of origin (EU vs third countries)
    - BAMF-Bericht (2019): Tabelle 8-7: Ausländische Bevölkerung nach ausgewählten Staatsangehörigkeiten 2004 sowie 2016 bis 2019 (jeweils zum 31. Dezember), S. 312-313
  - age

- BAMF-Bericht (2019): Tabelle 1-13: Zu- und Fortzüge nach Altersgruppen von 2000 bis 2019, S. 256
- gender
  - BAMF-Bericht (2019): Tabelle 1-14: Zu- und Fortzüge nach Geschlecht seit 2000, S. 257
  - **Demografie von Asylsuchenden in Deutschland: Infografiken zu Alter, Geschlecht und Herkunft von Asylsuchenden (2014-2020):**  
<https://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/flucht/zahlen-zu-asyl/265710/demografie>
- b. Share of foreigners in the total number of your country's population in the last decade (2010-2020), including share of EU nationals vs. third countries nationals
  - BAMF-Bericht (2019): Tabelle 8-5: Gesamtbevölkerung und ausländische Bevölkerung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland seit 1951 nach der Bevölkerungsfortschreibung, S. 308-309
  - BAMF-Bericht (2019): Abbildung 8-13: Ausländische Bevölkerung in Deutschland von 1980 bis 2019 nach der Bevölkerungsfortschreibung, S. 311
  - <https://www.bpb.de/nachschlagen/zahlen-und-fakten/soziale-situation-in-deutschland/61646/migrationshintergrund-i>
  - <https://www.bpb.de/nachschlagen/zahlen-und-fakten/soziale-situation-in-deutschland/150599/migrationshintergrund-iii>
  - Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit – Destatis: 1 Bevölkerung insgesamt und ausländische Bevölkerung 1871 bis 2019, S. 18
- c. Number of foreign employees in your country and their share in the overall number of people employed in your country
  - BAMF-Bericht (2019): Tabelle 3-22: Erwerbsmigration von hochqualifizierten Fachkräften nach § 19a AufenthG (Blaue Karte EU) nach den häufigsten Staatsangehörigkeiten (Einreise im jeweiligen Berichtsjahr, S. 262

- BAMF-Bericht (2019): Tabelle 3-23: Erwerbsmigration von Hochqualifizierten nach § 19a AufenthG (Blaue Karte EU) im Jahr 2019 nach den häufigsten Staatsangehörigkeiten, Art der Beschäftigung und Geschlecht, S. 263
  - <https://www.bpb.de/nachschlagen/zahlen-und-fakten/soziale-situation-in-deutschland/61649/migrationshintergrund-ii>
- d. Number of undocumented migrants or illegal crossings in your country
- BAMF-Bericht (2019): Tabelle 6-2: Feststellungen von unerlaubt eingereisten ausländischen Staatsangehörigen an den deutschen Grenzen und Zurückschiebungen von 2000 bis 2019, S. 303
- e. Number of applications for international protection (asylum / subsidiary protection) vs. granting international protection per year (2010-2020), including applicants' countries of origin
- BAMF-Bericht (2019): Tabelle 3-33: Asylantragstellende (Erstanträge) nach ausgewählten Staatsangehörigkeiten von 2000 bis 2019, S. 273-279
  - BAMF-Bericht (2019): Tabelle 5-6: Asylantragstellende (Erst- und Folgeanträge) in den EU-28-Staaten<sup>1</sup> sowie in Island, Liechtenstein, der Schweiz und Norwegen von 2000 bis 2019, S. 301-302
  - <https://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/flucht/zahlen-zu-asyl/265710/demografie>
- f. Number of granted citizenships per year (2010-2020)
- BAMF-Bericht (2019): Tabelle 8-13: Einbürgerungen nach ausgewählten Herkunftsstaaten von 2000 bis 2019, S.320
- g. Public attitudes towards migrants and migrant integration (2010-2020, please provide comparison of at least two time points – one before the migration crisis 2015/2016 and one after)
- Migration – eine lange Geschichte: <https://www.bpb.de/mediathek/324797/migration-eine-lange-geschichte>

- <https://www.integrationsbeauftragte.de/resource/blob/89600/1699390/478a6d7d9cd3fc2c18131ebfcfef3dac/lagebericht-12-data.pdf>

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- Vor 2015/2016: The Impact of Immigration on Germany's Society (2005):  
[https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/european\\_migration\\_network/reports/docs/emn-studies/illegally-resident/de-finalstudy-eng\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/emn-studies/illegally-resident/de-finalstudy-eng_en.pdf)

h. Structure of ethnic minorities residing in your country (origin and numbers)

- <https://www.bpb.de/nachschlagen/zahlen-und-fakten/soziale-situation-in-deutschland/61631/staatsangehoerigkeit>

i. Number of diaspora communities residing abroad and the most important host countries